27. On the other hand, the Court notes that during the public hearing, the State was asked to submit the criminal procedural legislation in force at the time of the facts. In this regard, the Court observes that the State did not submit any document in response to the aforementioned request. B. Admissibility of testimonial and expert evidence 28. The Court considers it appropriate to admit the statements and opinions given at the public hearing15 and statements rendered before a notary public16 insofar as they comply with the purpose defined by the President in the Order ordering them to be received.17 29. On the other hand, the Court notes that the State, in its final written arguments, questioned the probative value of the joint expert opinion offered by Mr. Parvais Jabbar and Mr. Edward Fitzgerald. In particular, in addition to refuting some of the assertions made by them, it indicated that said experts failed to refer to certain facts that, according to the State, were relevant.18 In its final written arguments, the State also questioned the probative value of the statements of Miriam Floridalma Osorio García and Irma Morales Morataya. Furthermore, with respect to the affidavit of Mrs. Irma Morales Morataya, the State indicated in its final written arguments that neither her signature nor that of the notary coincided with their signatures. With regard to the latter, the Court observes that the State has not carried out any type of evidentiary activity to rebut the presumption of veracity that all public documents enjoy. With respect to the remaining allegations, as well as the allegations relating to the joint expert opinion offered by Mr. Parvais Jabbar and Mr. Edward Fitzgerald, the Court will take these arguments into account and will establish the considerations conducive to the resolution of the instant case when addressing the disputed facts. VII FACTS 30. In this chapter, the Court will establish the facts of the case based on the factual framework submitted to the Court by the Inter-American Commission, in relation to: (i) the normative context in Guatemala with respect to the death penalty, and (ii) the criminal proceedings against Mr. Rodríguez Revolorio, Mr. López Calo and Mr. Archila Pérez. A. Normative framework in Guatemala with respect to the death penalty 31. The death penalty is provided for both in the Constitution and in Guatemala’s criminal legislation. Article 18 of the Guatemalan Constitution recognizes the possibility of applying the death penalty.19 Likewise, article 43 of the Criminal Code in force in 1997 stipulated the following: In the public hearing, the Court received the testimony of Miguel Ángel Rodríguez Revolorio. The Court received the testimonies rendered before a notary public (affidavit) of Miriam Floridalma Osorio García de López, Irma Morales Morata, Víctor Hugo Cano and Roberto Enrique Quiñónez Días, as well as of the expert witnesses Alberto Bovino and Juan José Hernández Mejía, proposed by the representatives. 17 The objects of all these declarations are set forth in the Order of the President of the Inter-American Court issued on February 15, 2019. Available at: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/asuntos/rodriguez_revolorio_15_02_19.pdf 18 The State indicated in particular that the experts "[...] failed to explain that said judgment was converted to deprivation of liberty and that Mr. Rodríguez Revolorio enjoyed the benefit of early release. They also failed to state that said persons were members of the State security forces and were sentenced for the crimes of murder and attempted murder [...]". 19 Political Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala decreed by the Constituent Assembly, May 31, 1985, Reformed by the Popular Consultation Legislative Agreement 18-93: "Article 18. Death penalty. The death penalty may not be imposed in the following cases. a. Based on presumptions; b. On women c. On those over sixty years of age; d. On those convicted of political crimes and common crimes related to political crimes, and 15 16 9