acquired right to remain in office, without providing him with an opportunity to state his case in this regard and without respecting minimum guarantees. 18. He maintained that the principle of legality in relation to his right to a defense was violated, because there was no statutory provision for the possibility of removing him from office, through a Decree such as the one issued by Congress. He added that the decision was unfounded, as it did not refer to the reasons and legal norms supporting his removal from office. 19. He argued the violation of the right to judicial protection. Although the remedy provided for in the Constitution in force at the time was the amparo action, this was not effective, since a decision issued by Congress established that the only way to suspend the effects of a parliamentary resolution for alleged violation of the Constitution was the unconstitutionality action. He stated that the action of unconstitutionality was also ineffective and that its submission would have produced a manifestly absurd result because a declaration of unconstitutionality of Resolution R-25-160 would have caused the new members of the Constitutional Tribunal themselves de facto to declare that their appointments were made arbitrarily and, therefore, that they should be removed from their positions. Regarding the contentious administrative proceedings, he argued that this was not adequate, since this jurisdiction was not competent according to the Statute on the Contentious Administrative Jurisdiction. 20. He stated that the lack of an effective remedy was aggravated by the fact that during several months in 2005, the country lacked a Constitutional Court, since the National Congress, through another decision, had dismissed the Members arbitrarily appointed on November 25, 2004. 21. The IACHR will not refer to the arguments related to political rights taking into account that in its Decision on Admissibility it declared such claims inadmissible. B. Position of the State 22. The State indicated that Resolution R-25-160 is an administrative act emanating from a competent authority, since the Political Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador of 1998 established that the National Congress was in charge of appointing the members of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, to examine their requests and also to designate their replacements. 23. It argued that the Ecuadorian domestic legal system does not provide for jurisdictional features among the functions or powers of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and that the argument of attempting to assimilate it with a judicial authority is weak because of the different nature of the functions performed. It also pointed out that the position of Member of the Supreme Tribunal was not exercised as a subjective right, but as a subjective public right on behalf of society. 24. It argued that if there were an inference to be drawn – without reference to context - from the decisions of the Inter-American Court in the Camba Campos and others and Quintana Coello et al. cases, as proven facts in this case, the State of Ecuador’s right of defense would be irremediably breached, as well as the basic procedural principles of the Inter-American system. 25. It also indicated that the petitioner did not satisfactorily demonstrate the reasons why the petition was submitted solely by himself, and not by the other Members of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, who, according to his assertions, were also affected by the Ecuadorian State. 26. Regarding the law, it argued that judicial guarantees had not been not violated. It pointed out that the Inter-American Court has recognized that judicial guarantees do not apply in the same way in proceedings that are not judicial in nature and stated that the regulations in force at the time of the events in this case show that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal was not a Court or judicature but an institution with an operative electoral character, for which the guarantee of being heard by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal is not applicable. 3