E. Extraordinary appeal and complaint appeal 35. On February 24, 1998, the defense of Mr. Gorigoitia filed an extraordinary appeal with the Supreme Court of Justice of the Province of Mendoza.20 The defense requested quashing of the judgment of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice and the issuance of a new judgment “in formal terms and in line with the law.”21 It was indicated that the judgments of the Criminal Court and the Supreme Court had turned out to be arbitrary for the following reasons: The legal situation of Gorigoitia [had to be] appraised on the basis of the principle in dubio pro reo, when deciding if the criminal category to be established was a manslaughter or a culpable homicide. (…) The gross negligence that was attributed to the actions of the accused was never proven, and what emerged with greater certainty was that, at most and in the worst of cases, the blame was the most judicious in view of the particular features of the incident. (…) What the cassation appeal is arguing is not a mere discrepancy, in terms of the appraisal, with the Court issuing the judgment; the discrepancy goes far beyond that and is essentially aimed censuring a criterion of appraisal of the evidence supported by the pure and exclusive subjectivism of the judges, who in addition departed (…) from the facts, common sense, and the rules of sound criticism.22 36. He also added that there was a grievance involved in “dismissing the need to undertake a thorough and detailed interpretation of the records of the proceedings, as well as basically dismissing the examination of arguments from the defense (…) both in the discussion and in the cassation appeal.”23 37. On March 11, 1998, the Prosecutor General of the Supreme Court of Justice of Mendoza issued a writ indicating that the extraordinary appeal must be declared admissible. The Prosecutor invoked Article 8.2 h) of the American Convention and Article 14.5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), indicating that “the guarantee of appeal has been enshrined in a truly broad fashion for the benefit of the accused and cannot be confined or restricted for the purpose of meeting excessive formal requirements.”24 38. On March 31, 1998, the Supreme Court of Justice of the Province of Mendoza turned down the extraordinary appeal, indicating that: (…) the complainant is not challenging a judgment, but rather an “order” issued by the present Chamber II which is formally rejecting the cassation appeal because it does not meet the requirements expressly set forth in Mendoza’s criminal procedural law and jurisprudence (…). (…) The doctrine of arbitrariness is not aimed at rectifying, in courts of third instance, erroneous rulings or those that the complainant considers are erroneous, in accordance with the complainant’s divergence from the interpretation given by the judges to the common facts and laws, including respect for the standards that are deemed to be clear. (...) In the case in lite, the ruling that is being challenged has been duly grounded in Mendoza’s procedural law and related jurisprudence, of which the complainant is unaware (…).25 20 Petition of January 19, 1999 and Extraordinary Appeal, February 25, 1998, page 1, Attachment to the initial petition. 21 Extraordinary Appeal, February 25, 1998, page 1, Attachment to the initial petition. 22 Extraordinary Appeal, February 25, 1998, pages 14 y 15, Attachment to the initial petition. 23 Extraordinary Appeal, February 25, 1998, pages 14 y 15, Attachment to the initial petition. General Prosecution Service of the Supreme Court of Justice, Mendoza, challenge to the extraordinary appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, March 11, 1998, Attachment to the initial petition. 24 25 Supreme Court of Justice of the Province of Mendoza, Case File No. 62.145: “Civil and Fiscal Party, c/ GORIGOITIA GUERRERO, Oscar Raúl,” March 31, 1998, page 3, Attachment to the initial petition. 8