169. In the case of María Fernanda Peña Gallardo, the State argued that there was no evidence to corroborate that she had been subjected to psychological torture by the State. It underscored that neither the State nor its agents had executed deliberate acts to undermine her mental resistance and force her to incriminate herself and confess to certain criminal acts or be subjected intentionally to a context of intense anguish and suffering. It added that the alleged anguish suffered owing to the publication of news articles and/or photographs in the media could not be considered acts by the State that violated her dignity, because they were related to a major criminal act that had generated a legitimate interest for the press to report on it. It indicated that, since she had been linked to the robbery, she had become a person of public interest. B. Considerations of the Court 170. In this section, the Court will establish (1) general guidelines on the right to personal integrity and the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, and the means of evidence, and then analyze (2) the facts related to the torture and ill-treatment suffered during the raids and the detentions; (3) in particular, the sexual violence suffered by the women; (4) the determination of the ill-treatment that occurred and its legal classification as torture; (5) the measures of solitary confinement, and (6) the conditions of the detention centers and, lastly, it will examine (7) the specific case of the alleged violation of the personal integrity of María Peña Gallardo. B.1. General guidelines on the right to personal integrity and the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, and the means of evidence 171. Article 5(1) of the Convention recognizes the right to physical, mental and moral integrity in general terms, while, Article 5(2) establishes, more specifically, the absolute prohibition of subjecting anyone to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, as well as the right of all persons deprived of liberty to be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. The Court understands that any violation of Article 5(2) of the American Convention necessarily results in the violation of Article 5(1) of this instrument.244 In addition, the Court has established that torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is strictly and categorically prohibited by international human rights law245 – absolutely and irrevocably – and nowadays this prohibition forms part of international jus cogens.246 Cf. Case of Yvon Neptune v. Haiti. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 6, 2008. Series C No. 180, para. 129, and Case of Azul Rojas Marín et al. v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of March 12, 2020. Series C No. 402, para. 139. 244 245 Cf. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 7; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Article 2; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 37, and International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Article 10 and, at the regional level, Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Articles 1 and 5; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 5; African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Article 16; Convention of Belém do Pará, Article 4, and European Convention on Human Rights, Article 3. Cf. Case of Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 27, 2003. Series C No. 103, para. 92, and Case of Bedoya Lima et al. v. Colombia. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 26, 2021. Series C No. 431, para. 100. In this regard, see, Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which establishes: “A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” 246 50