7. The petitioners state that on June 3, and after the granting of provisional measures by the I/A Court H.R. on May 29, 2013, the pregnancy was terminated and Beatriz sterilized at her request. They assert that the new born weighed 518 grams and was 29 cm long, with no skullcap or brain tissue, and was showed to Beatriz by the doctors, dying five hours later. They say that on June 10, at her request, Beatriz was released from hospital. 8. They state that further judicial actions were brought on account of the facts denounced, including a complaint filed on July 3, 2013 with the Office of the Attorney for the Defense of Human Rights (Ombudsperson), for violation of the right to life due to failure to interrupt the pregnancy. That complaint was admitted on the grounds that, if true, the facts of the case would constitute impairment of the rights to health, personal integrity/humane treatment, and to special medical treatment, with consequent danger to life due to lack of medical care, as well as to the right of access to justice. At the same time, the authorities involved were asked to provide information. The petitioners state that, as of the date of presentation of the complaint to the IACHR, they had no knowledge of any further actions. They also went to the Office of the Prosecutor General (Fiscalía General de la República), which body said that it had already issued its opinion in connection with the action for enforcement of rights proceedings (amparo), clarified the norms currently in effect, and stated that, if the alleged facts were true, the medical staff could be liable for failure to do their duty. On May 23, 2013, a complaint was filed with the Government Ethics Tribunal against the Director of the Institute of Forensic Medicine (a body that was asked for an expert opinion during the amparo proceedings) for violating his moral duties when he publicly queried the Hospital's diagnosis and failed to recuse himself due to conflict of interest, since his spouse pertains to the "Fundación Sí a la Vida" [Pro-Life Foundation], an organization that attempted to act as a third party in the amparo proceedings. The petitioners say that on October 23, 2013, the Tribunal refused to admit the proceeding on the grounds that the Director had not been a party to the amparo proceedings; nor had "Fundación Sí a la Vida" intervened as a third party benefited by them. 9. The petitioners argue that criminal legislation in El Salvador against abortion is ambiguous, incomplete, and opposed to the legislature's obligation to amend or abolish laws and practices that favor the persistence or tolerance of violence against women, since Article 133 of the Criminal Code contains no legal characterization of the conduct constituting an offense. It simply provides for its punishment. They argue that such ambiguity allows one conduct to be characterized as one or more offenses, so that a person accused of the crime of abortion may later be accused of aggravated homicide, with consequent adjustment of the sentences handed down. They argue that the norms in force and State practice with respect to abortion impose gender stereotypes and roles that materialize as a form of discrimination against girls and women. 10. They further argue that there is no appropriate domestic remedy to safeguard Beatriz's rights in a timely manner. They maintain that, in connection with unconstitutionality proceeding 18-98, the SC-CSJ considered that in cases of therapeutic, ethical, and eugenic abortion the conflict can only be regulated via a single penalization system (sistema común de penalización) and that the regulation of said norm is incomplete inasmuch as it operates only once acts have already been consummated, "so that it is not possible for a judge or other State entity to analyze and rule on a possible controversy preventively, with a view to authorizing or not authorizing an abortion." They state that a similar pronouncement was made by the Office of the Prosecutor-General (FGR) in response to a query by Beatriz's representative regarding application of the state of necessity contemplated in Article 27.3 of the Criminal Code, in the sense that the FGR considered that application of that notion can only be discussed within the framework of a criminal proceeding. For that reason, the petitioners argue that no appropriate domestic remedy exists. They also report that the SC-CSJ denied Beatriz access to a prompt and effective remedy for protecting her rights, because Beatriz had requested that her pregnancy be interrupted on March 14, 2013 (in the 14th week of pregnancy) and on April 11, 2013 an amparo action had been filed with the SC-CSJ (19th week of pregnancy), despite which the court had issued a final resolution after 48 days (26th week of pregnancy), which was not a reasonable period of time given the characteristics and urgency of the case, but rather an illusory and ineffective period of time, meaning that the Court had not acted with due diligence. The petitioners argue, at the same time, that in rejecting the amparo action , referred responsibility for a decision back to the physicians treating Beatriz, without resolving the obstacles Beatriz had had in accessing the treatment recommended. The petitioners likewise state that, through the SC-CSJ and the other authorities involved, the State engaged in institutional violence against Beatriz, by not 4