288. The IACHR takes note that many of the allegations of threats, harassment, surveillance, searches, and other acts of violence against CAJAR members were reported to state authorities. Based on the information presented by the State itself, none of the perpetrators of any of these acts has been either identified or punished thus far. Indeed, the Commission points out that many of the investigations opened are in a preliminary phase, while others have been shelved. Bearing in mind the number of reports received, the time elapsed since the acts occurred, and the failure, to date, to identify a single perpetrator, the Commission believes the investigation mechanisms proved ineffective as suitable avenues for identifying the sources of risk and enabling measures to be developed to, on the one hand, mitigate the risk, and on the other, to effectively protect CAJAR members against the commission or continuation of the acts against them. In this regard, reiterating the fundamental link in these cases between investigation and protection, the Commission deems that the lack of an effective response in the context of the investigations constituted a failure to comply with the duty to guarantee [rights] in both extremes. 289. Additionally, the duty to protect includes the obligation to adopt material protection measures. This, for purposes of preventing new acts of violence, threats, or harassment from being repeated or from occurring.538 The Commission recognizes that the Colombian State has adopted protection measures in favor of the CAJAR members. In this regard, the IACHR observes that in the context of the precautionary measures, Colombia reported on the system of protection for different CAJAR members, including the provision of armored vehicles, bodyguards, means of communication, etc. 290. The IACHR likewise takes note of the failings alleged by the petitioners with respect to implementation of those measures. In particular, the petitioners indicated that the DAS, in the context of its surveillance of CAJAR, intercepted messages of members of the organization who were using communication devices provided by the State. The petitioners also stated that they had to turn down the vehicles assigned to them because they had information that the military had reportedly infiltrated as drivers in an effort to obtain information about their activities. 291. Notwithstanding the actions implemented, the Commission points out that in these types of cases in which the facts being alleged are not isolated, but rather form part of an already verified context, the State response cannot be limited to the adoption of protection measures. For this reason, as previously indicated, a diligent and effective investigation is crucial in order to seriously identify sources of risk, and on the basis of its findings, take specific actions to mitigate them, as well as to ensure that protection measures are carefully designed to address them. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, this did not happen in the instant case. 292. On the contrary, the Commission believes that the State actively adopted measures that exacerbated the situation of risk the CAJAR members found themselves in. 293. First, the IACHR takes note of statements made by state officials about the work done by CAJAR members. The Commission observes that in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, a national army commander and Colombia’s National Narcotics Directorate indicated that CAJAR had ties to the guerrillas and were defenders of the FARC. In 2003, the then President of the Republic stated that, “collectives appeared (…), that ultimately serve terrorism and that heinously shield themselves under the flag of human rights.” The next year, that same President of the Republic also declared that CAJAR members “use human rights as a pretext for providing coverage to terrorists.” The Commission takes note that those statements by the then President were denounced and examined by the Constitutional Court, as established in the finding of facts section. 294. Moreover, in 2004 a Colombian senator stated that CAJAR was an organization involved with “the dark money moved by the guerrillas.” That same year, the then governor of the Department of Cesar stated that CAJAR was a “procurer for the guerrillas.” 295. The Commission reiterates that these statements are relevant to the analysis of attribution of responsibility for the threats, harassment, and acts of violence against CAJAR members, inasmuch as they IACHR, Case 12.442, Application to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Gabriela Perozo et al., Venezuela, April 12, 2007, paragraph 133. 538 55