1. Rights to prior notification in detail of charges,33 to adequate time and means for the preparation of one’s defense, 34 and to be assisted by legal counsel of one’s own choosing35 79. The Commission recalls that the right of defense implies that anyone on trial, including in an administrative proceeding, will be able to defend their interests or rights effectively and on “equal procedural terms ... and be fully informed of the charges against them.”36 80. For its part, the Inter-American Court has held that in order to satisfy that guarantee “the State must notify the accused not only of the charges against him, that is, the crimes or offenses he is charged with, but also of the reasons for them, and the evidence for such charges and the legal definition of the facts. The defendant has the right to know, through a clear, detailed and precise description, all the information of the facts in order to fully exercise his right to defense and prove to the judge his version of the facts. [This right] applies even before the ‘charges,’ in a strict sense, are filed. For this right to fully operate and satisfy its inherent aims, it is necessary for said notification to take place before the accused renders his first statement before any public authority.”37 81. As regards the right to adequate time and means for the preparation of one’s defense, the Commission has referred to the need to ensure that persons are able to “prepare their defense, present arguments, and offer pertinent evidence,” which guarantees are impossible to exercise when the time provided by state authorities is “unreasonably short.” 82. As to the right to technical defense, the Inter-American Court has found that the right to defense arises as of the moment in which an investigation into an individual is ordered, who must have access to defense counsel from the moment they give their statement, since to deny them that possibility is “to strictly limit the right to defense, which leads to a procedural imbalance and leaves the individual unprotected before the punishing authority.” Furthermore, in the case of Vélez Loor v. Panama, the Court stated that “if the right to defense arises as from the moment the investigation begins or the authority in charge orders or executes actions entailing an infringement of rights,38 the person subjected to a sanctioning administrative proceeding must have access to procedural representation from that moment onwards.”39 83. In first place, in the instant case the alleged victim said that he received no formal notice that he was being placed under investigation, stating the charges with which he was accused or the legal nature thereof. The state has not succeeded in refuting that assertion by providing a written notice meeting the abovecited parameters.40 In that regard, the State has not demonstrated that Mr. Mina Cuero was given clear and detailed information about the institution of a proceeding against him and its factual and legal grounds, either before he gave his statement on September 17, 2000, or prior to the hearing held on October 25, 2000. 84. In second place, the Commission notes that the statement given to the Judicial Police on September 18, 2000, was done without legal counsel present. In relation to the State's contention regarding the lack of "legal relevance" of that statement, the IACHR underscores that fair trial guarantees, particularly as 33 Article 8(2)(b) of the American Convention recognizes the judicial guarantee of “prior notification in detail to the accused of the charges against him.” 34 Article 8(2)(c) of the American Convention establishes the guarantee of “adequate time and means for the preparation of his defense.” 35 Article 8(2)(d) of the American Convention establishes the “right of the accused to defend himself personally or to be assisted by legal counsel of his own choosing, and to communicate freely and privately with his counsel.” 36 I/A Court H.R., Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03 of September 17, 2003. Series A No. 18, par. 117. 37I/A Court H.R. Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of November 17, 2009, Series C No. 206, pars. 28 and 30. 38 I/A Court H.R., Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 23, 2010, Series C. No. 218, par. 132. 39 I/A Court H.R., Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 23, 2010, Series C. No. 218, par. 132. 40 With respect to the rules on the burden of proof in response to similar submissions, see I/A Court H.R. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of November 21, 2007, Series C No. 170, par. 73.