28. The State mentioned that the petitioner filed an unconstitutionality suit against the decision of the Disciplinary Tribunal, which the Constitutional Court rejected on August 14, 2001, with the argument that nothing unconstitutional had been proven. It added that the aforementioned proceeding observed all procedural guarantees. 29. As to the admissibility of the petition, the State held that it was not lodged within six months of the final decision in the proceeding. The State counted the time in two different ways to support this submission: At first, it said that the final decision was the judgment of the Constitutional Court rejecting the unconstitutionality suit on August 14, 2001, and that the petition was lodged on March 11, 2002 (the date on which the petition was received at the IACHR); in other words, 25 days after the six-month time limit. 30. Subsequently, the State held that the final decision was the Constitutional Court’s judgment of March 16, 2001, by which it dismissed the application for constitutional relief (amparo), and that the petition was lodged on February 28, 2002 (the date on which the petitioner sent the petition); in other words, 11 months and 12 days after notice was served. It argued that the appropriate remedy for resolving the petitioner's legal situation was the application for constitutional relief (amparo), not the unconstitutionality suit, and therefore, the six-month time limit should be counted from the decision on the application for constitutional relief at last instance. 31. As regards legal arguments, it argued that it did not violate his right to a fair trial. Specifically, it said that it had not violated the right to a hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal because the Disciplinary Tribunal was the competent organ under the law to try disciplinary violations committed by members of the police and the latter had acted in an independent and impartial manner. 32. It said that violations of the guarantees envisaged in Article 8(2) of the Convention could not be recognized because they only apply to criminal proceedings. It said that it had not violated the rights to prior notification in detail of the charges against him and to adequate time and means for the preparation of his defense because the petitioner was notified of the proceeding before the disciplinary tribunal sufficiently in advance for him to prepare his defense and he was represented by a lawyer during the proceeding. 33. It held that it had not violated the right to appeal the judgment to a higher court because the National Police Personnel Law provided an appeal, in spite of which, at no time did the petitioner invoke it and in any case the petitioner obtained a judicial review of the decision to dismiss him through an application for constitutional relief (amparo). 34. As regards the alleged violation of the right to be assisted by legal counsel provided by the State, the State said that the statement given by the petitioner without a defense lawyer present was not taken into account at any stage of the disciplinary proceeding. 35. As to the principle of legality, the State argued that the competence of the Disciplinary Tribunal, the punishable conduct, and the penalties imposed were all recognized in the Disciplinary Regulations of the National Police and in the National Police Personnel Law. 36. Finally, the State contended that there had been no violation of the right to judicial protection, since the petitioner had had access to the application for constitutional relief, which was a simple and prompt recourse, and the fact that it was not decided in the petitioner's favor did not mean that he been denied access to it. III. ANALYSIS OF ADMISSIBILITY