charges.”133 The Commission considers that compliance with these guarantees established in the Convention applies to all forms of deprivation of liberty and that Article 7 of the American Convention does not make distinctions in that regard. 88. As noted above, at the time of the facts of this case police edicts were in effect that allowed police officers to detain people based on denunciations or suspicions, without the need to secure a judicial arrest warrant or accredit "in flagranti" circumstances, and without indication that said edicts require informing those detained of the reasons for their detention. The Commission considers that the State did not demonstrate that, in its regulations, police powers to detain were regulated with the defined legal precision (tipicidad) required to evaluate whether a detention was legal. Nor is there any indication that said edicts contained safeguards, such as the obligation of police officers to justify on objective grounds the reasons for the detention in connection with the supposed purpose of preventing crime, in such a way as to prevent possible discriminatory uses of those powers, which, as pointed out in the foregoing section, represent one of the main risks posed by broad powers of detention, such as those analyzed in the instant case. 89. In the use made of those powers in this case, the detention of José Delfín Acosta was not carried out on the basis of a written warrant by a competent authority, but based on an alleged anonymous complaint and, according to the State, specifically in accordance with an "edict on drunkenness." From the statements of persons who witnessed those deeds, as well as of the police officers themselves, José Delfín Acosta was not informed that that was the reason for his detention; what is more, there is nothing in the file to indicate that he was given any reason whatsoever for his detention. 90. The Commission considers that it is irrelevant whether or not an anonymous complaint was received. What matters for determining whether the detention was arbitrary is whether there were objective grounds justifying it with respect to José Delfín Acosta. On this, the Commission considers that the absence of such grounds is evident inasmuch as even after confirming that neither the alleged victim nor Mr. Wagner Da Luz were bearing arms and after ascertaining over the police digital radio system that there was "no restraining order" restricting Mr. Acosta's freedom of movement, the police decided to take him to police station No. 5, together with the Da Luz brothers. There is not a single official document explaining the reasons why, after carrying out those checks, it was admissible to detain Mr. Acosta for crime prevention purposes. At the same time, if the purpose was to protect his life and bodily integrity given the alleged symptoms of intoxication, the State should have taken him immediately to a health center, not deprive of liberty in the police station. 91. The Commission cannot fail to note that both Mr. Acosta and the Da Luz brothers were foreigners and Afro-descendants, a fact that José Delfín Acosta himself underscored during the police operation. As indicated previously, rules allowing the police to deprive a person of liberty based on suspicions and for citizen security reasons, if they are not accompanied by proper safeguards to ensure objectivity, end up being used arbitrarily and based on prejudices and stereotypes regarding certain groups who happen to be traditional victims of discrimination, such as persons of African descent. Thus, given the existence of edicts that did not establish said safeguards, the total lack of objective grounds given in this specific case and the circumstances surrounding it, including José Delfín's own assessment of what was happening -- which was not disproved by the State through any diligent investigation -- the Commission determines that his detention was not only illegal but, given the lack of legal definition (tipicidad) of the scope of the powers used, also arbitrary and discriminatory. 92. From the above, the Inter-American Commission concludes that the Argentine State is responsible for violating the rights established in Articles 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, and 24 of the American Convention in conjunction with the general obligations established in Article 1.1 and 2 of the same instrument, to the detriment of José Delfín Acosta. I/A Court H.R., Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 24, 2012. Series C No. 251, par. 132. 133