9 24 rules of general international law . In fact, such conception also fails to explain the incidence of elements independent of the free will of States in the process of formation of contemporary international law. If it is by their free will that States create and apply the norms of international law - as that conception seeks to sustain, - it is also by their free will that States violate those norms, and the voluntarist conception in this way revolves itself, pathetically, in vicious circles and intellectual acrobatics, incapable of providing a reasonable explanation for the formation of customary norms and the evolution itself of general international law. 24. There is pressing need for contemporary doctrine to devote more attention to a curious phenomenon, with important juridical implications: while the law of treaties remains conditioned by the manifestations of the voluntarist conception of international law, customary law appears much less vulnerable to this latter. This being so, it would not be possible, for example, to speak of limitations ratione temporis to the competence of an international tribunal (such as the one raised in the present case) in relation to norms of general international law. Nor would it be possible to speak of restrictions or reservations to customary norms. The opinio juris sive necessitatis (the subjective element of custom), as manifestation of the international juridical conscience, reveals nowadays much more vigour than the secular postulates of the law of treaties, when one comes to establish new legal regimes of protection of the human being against particularly grave violations of his rights. 25. Although the two aforementioned Vienna Conventions provide for the function of jus cogens in the domain proper to the law of treaties, it is an ineluctable consequence of the existence itself of imperative norms of international law that these latter are not limited to the violations resulting from treaties, and that they encompass every and any violation, including those resulting from every and any action and any unilateral acts of the States. To the objetive international responsibility of the States corresponds necessarily the notion of objetive illegality (one of the elements underlying the concept of jus cogens). In our days, no one would dare to deny the objective illegality of systematic practices of torture, of summary and extra-legal executions, and of forced disappearance of persons, practices which constitute crimes against humanity, - condemned by the universal juridical conscience, parallel to the application of treaties. VII. The Emergence of Erga Omnes Obligations of Protection. 26. This entire doctrinal evolution points in the direction of the consolidation of erga omnes obligations of protection, that is, obligations pertaining to the protection of human beings, which are due to the international community as a whole. The time has come to develop the first jurisprudential indications in this respect, already advanced almost three decades ago, in the cas célèbre of the 25 Barcelona Traction (1970) . The time has come to develop them systematically in 24. Cf. U.N., United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations (Vienna, 1986) - Official Records, volume I, N.Y., U.N., 1995, pp. 187-188. 25. It may be recalled that, in that case, the International Court of Justice for the first time distinguished, on the one hand, the inter-State obligations (proper to the contentieux diplomatique), and, on the other, the obligations of a State vis-à-vis the international community as a whole (erga omnes obligations). These latter - the Court added - derive, e.g., in contemporary international law, inter alia, from "the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person", - it so happening that some rights of protection "have entered into the body of general international law", and others are set forth in international