10 son, Juan Manuel Ayala Montero, was a student in the city of Bucaramanga. None reported fearing for their safety. c. Luis José Pundor Quintero, also over the telephone, informed the representatives that because of the threats he and his family had received and the lack of any sort of investigation as to their origin, they had decided to leave the country. The representatives furthermore indicated that in May 2010, the family was residing illegally in another country, and that they had expressed their wish to return to Colombia even though they continued to fear for their lives. 30. By virtue of the information presented by the representatives, the State requested an abatement of the provisional measures with respect to these three beneficiaries and their families. The State argued that the beneficiaries’ unwillingness to entertain the security measures the State was offering constituted a waiver of the same. Additionally, with respect to each of them, the State considered that: a. Salomón Flórez Contreras and his family were in a situation that had returned to normal; therefore, they did not meet the basic requisites for provisional measures. b. Sandra Belinda Montero Fuentes and her family were no longer faced with the situation of extreme gravity and urgency that prompted the measures in the first place. c. Given that Luis José Pundor Quintero and his family were located outside of the country, there did not exist a real possibility of effectively implementing a scheme of protection and security for them. 31. The Commission noted the representatives’ remarks regarding Salomón Flórez Contreras, Sandra Belinda Montero Fuentes, and their families, for which “[the Commission] did not make any observations as to the State’s request for abatement.” Regarding the beneficiary Luis José Pundor Quintero and his family, the Commission observed that a lack of security had led to the international displacement of the Pundor Quintero family, because of which it viewed the State’s request for abatement as “improper.” Nonetheless, because the representatives presented no observations to the State’s repeated requests for abatement of the provisional measures, the Commission “underst[ood] that it [was the] [beneficiaries’] will not to continue with the security measures[, because of which] it did not have any particular observations as to the State’s request,” “absent information from the representatives to the contrary.” 32. The Court calls to mind the fact that the practical effectiveness of provisional measures depends, in large part, on the existence of a real possibility that they eventually come to be implemented.11 Likewise, the Court finds it prudent to reiterate that provisional measures are of an exceptional nature: they are mandated as a way of providing much-needed protection, and once they have been ordered they must remain in place for as long as the Court finds that the basic requisites of extreme gravity, urgency, and the need to prevent irreparable harm are present.12 11 Cf. Case of Caballero Delgado and Santana V. Colombia. Provisional Measures regarding Colombia. Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of July 4, 2006, Considering clause thirteen; Case of Caballero Delgado and Santana V. Colombia. Provisional Measures regarding Colombia. Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of February 3, 2010, Considering clause sixteen. 12 Case of the Constitutional Court V. Peru. Provisional Measures regarding Peru. Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of March 14, 2001, Considering clause three; Matter of Adrián Meléndez Quijano et al. Provisional Measures regarding El Salvador. Order of the Inter-American Court