36. The discussion regarding the conformity of nighttime raids with the Convention should be situated at the intersection between criminal procedure, constitutional law, and international human rights law. The tension between individual rights and collective or State interests is revealed with greatest intensity in the context of criminal proceedings. The way in which the State manages this tension is one of the main indicators of the level of protection of individual rights and guarantees provided by the respective legal and constitutional order. In this regard, Roxin and Schünemann state that criminal procedural law is the “seismograph of the State’s Constitution.” 64 37. This tensional relationship between individual rights and criminal prosecution, the compass of which is the constitutional order, may be examined from a twofold perspective. On the one hand, the national constitutions together with the Convention and other international legal instruments contain a series of “fundamental procedural rights,” such as the right to due process of law, the right to adversarial proceedings, and to a complete defense, the right to the presumption of innocence, and the right to remain silent. 38. However, from another perspective, criminal proceedings consist of interventions or restrictions of the “common” fundamental rights – although not of the rights that are specifically related to criminal proceedings such as those mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. For example, wiretapping represents an intervention in the right of the inviolability of communications; arrests in flagrante delicto and pre-trial detention are (severe) restrictions of the right to freedom of movement, sureties are an intervention in the right to property, etc. Also, home searches entail an intervention in the right to the inviolability of the home (particularly during nighttime), and in the right to intimacy and privacy. Thus, the coercive measures used against the accused during criminal proceedings (in the broadest sense, including the investigation stage), such as a home searches (at night), 65 are not merely criminal procedural tools available to the State, but constitute real interventions in fundamental rights and should be legally examined as such. 66 This means that the constitutional (and conventional) law apparatus should be used to verify the legitimacy of such restrictions of the individual’s most basic and essential rights. The criminal procedure should, therefore, be conceived using a pre-established standard, such as applied constitutional law (and, let it be said, convention-based law). 67 39. Intervention or restrictions of rights are not synonymous with violations of rights. 68 Restrictions of rights may be justified provided they meet two basic and essential 64 ROXIN, Claus; SCHÜNEMANN, Bernd. Strafverfahrensrecht, 30th ed., Munich: C.H. Beck, 2022, § 2 Nm. 1. Regarding the relationship between Constitution and Criminal Procedure, see also, FIGUEIREDO DIAS, Jorge de. A Nova Constituição e o processo penal, Revista da Ordem dos Advogados, ano 36. I-III, 1976, pp. 103 ff; BARREIROS, José António. A Nova Constituição Processual Penal, Revista da Ordem dos Advogados, Lisboa, ano 48, v. 2, sept. 1988, pp. 425 ff; TASLITZ, Andrew; PARIS, Margaret; HERBERT, Lenese. Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 3rd ed., New York: Foundation Press, 2007, pp. 2 ff. 65 Regarding the level of intervention in basic rights (severe) of home searches, cf. PARK, Tido. Durchsuchung und Beschlagnahme, 5th ed., Munich: H. Beck, 2022, § 1 No. 23. 66 Cf. SCHMIDT, Eberhard. Von Sinn und Notwendigkeit wissenschaftlicher Behandlung des Strafprozeßrechts, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, 1953, p. 169 (“sensitive point of every criminal system”); AMELUNG, Knut. Zur dogmatischen Einordnung strafprozessualer Grundrechtseingriffe, Juristenzeitung 1987, pp. 737 ff; WOLTER, Jürgen. Verfassungsrecht im Strafprozeß- und Strafrechtssystem Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Verfassungsmäßigkeit der Norm und zum rechtsfreien Raum “vor dem Tatbestand,” Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht, 1993, pp. 1 ff. 67 Cf. GRECO, Luís. Introdução – O inviolável e o intocável no direito processual penal: Considerações introdutórias sobre o processo penal alemão (e suas relações com o direito constitucional, o direito de polícia e o direito dos serviços de inteligência) in WOLTER, Jürgen. O Inviolável e o Intocável no Direito Processual Penal: Reflexões sobre dignidade humana, proibições de prova, proteção de dados (e separação informacional de poderes) diante da persecução penal. Translated by Luís Greco, Alaor Leite, Eduardo Viana. 1st Edición. São Paulo: Marcial Pons, 2018, p. 30. Cf. also NEGRI, Daniele. Agli albori di un paradigma dell´italia repubblicana: il processo penale come “diritto constituzionale applicato,” in Diritti individuali e processo penale nell´Italia repubblicana, Milan, 2011, pp. 13 ff. Cf., similar distinction between “infringements” and “violations” in HUSAK, Douglas. Lifting the Cloak: Preventive Detention as Punishment, San Diego Law Review, vol. 48, 2011, p. 1191, “(…) rights are infringed when an action implicates rights justifiably, and rights are violated when an action implicates rights unjustifiably.” 68 9