pursued and exhausted with respect to the criminal cases themselves.8 What the Commission must examine is whether the proceeding has concluded and whether the respective ordinary remedies have been pursued; or in the alternative, if the case has not concluded, whether the exceptions allowed under Article 46(2) of the Convention apply. 48. From the information available, the Commission observes that the criminal cases referred to as Gader, Street Lamps, Mendieta (Villa Ayacucho), Mallasa and Esin are still being prosecuted, and were opened on June 21, 2000, June 20, 2000, January 25, 2000, January 26, 2001, and May 10, 2002, respectively. This information indicates that the oldest case has lasted 9 years and the most recent almost 7 years. The alleged victim has exercised her defense and has filed a number of remedies to protect her interests in the proceedings, including remedies of habeas corpus and motions to have the criminal action time-barred. The rules on burden of proof are that once the petitioners have alleged the existence of one of the objections provided for in Article 46(2) of the Convention, such as the unwarranted delay, it is up to the State to explain the reasons why the exception does not apply. 49. In the instant case, the Bolivian State argued that the use of the remedies to regain her freedom and to have the criminal case time-barred is what has caused the delay in prosecuting the cases. The Commission’s position is that invoking the remedies provided under domestic law to protect those interests –habeas corpus, for example- is the proper course of action and does not relieve the authorities of their duty to conduct the proceedings with all due speed. Furthermore the information available shows that there have been protracted periods of procedural inactivity and that at least 20 courts have taken cognizance of the cases, in most cases because of disqualifications and internal rotations unrelated to Mrs. Andrade’s conduct. 50. While it is true that the cases are still ongoing and the alleged victim could file ordinary remedies if convicted, in cases such as this, which may, prima facie, constitute unwarranted delay, the Commission deems that the persons being prosecuted cannot be required to wait until the final judgment is delivered before challenging alleged procedural irregularities. In the instant case, the Commission observes, moreover, that during the criminal cases, the alleged victim attempted other avenues to protect the rights that she alleges were violated, such as the petitions of habeas corpus and the motions to have the criminal action time barred.9 51. Given the 7 and 9 years that have passed since the proceedings were instituted, the fact that the cases do not appear to be particularly complex, the weak arguments the State used to explain the delay, and certain indicia pointing to periods of inactivity caused by suspended hearings and internal rotations of judges, the Commission, based on the exception recognized in Article 46(2)(c), deems Mrs. Andrade to be exempt from having to wait until the domestic criminal proceedings have concluded before turning to this international body. 52. Finally, as for the Guaglio case (Ham v. Monroy), the petitioners’ account indicates that Mrs. Andrade was definitively acquitted by a decision delivered on September 11, 2006. From the information available, it appears that this verdict was not appealed, thus ending the case against the alleged victim. The domestic remedies were exhausted in compliance with the requirement established in Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention. C. Time period for lodging the petition 53. Under Article 46(1)(b) of the American Convention, a petition must be lodged within six months from the date on which the party alleging violation of his rights was notified of the final judgment of the domestic courts. However, this rule does not apply when one of the exceptions that Article 46(2) of the Convention applies. In such cases, the Commission will consider whether the petition was lodged within a reasonable period of time, in accordance with Article 32 of its Rules of Procedure. See also: IACHR, Petition 1419-04. Hanny Fahmy, Costa Rica. Report No. 25/07, March 9, 2007. Para. 50. In addition to the petitions of habeas corpus that ultimately resulted in the alleged victim’s release, the petitioners filed repeated motions to have the criminal case time-barred. The decisions on those motions, issued on April 19, August 13 and November 30, 2005, were never in the alleged victim’s favor and were decided on the grounds that the delay was the fault of the accused because of the remedies they had invoked. 8 9 9