consider it necessary to examine the alleged violations of the other paragraphs of Article 7 of the Convention that were alleged by the Commission and the representatives. B.2.2) Deprivation of liberty of José Vicente Rubiano Galvis 411. The State argued that José Vicente Rubiano Galvis was deprived of his liberty by military authorities because he was found in flagrante delicto, infringing Decree 1056 of 1984. 631 According to the Commission, this decree was issued as a result of Decree 1038 of 1984, by which President Betancur decreed a state of emergency throughout national territory. The Court does not have precise information on the rights that were suspended under the said state of emergency or its specific conditions and scope in relation to Article 27 of the American Convention. 632 412. Nevertheless, the Court underlines the opinion of expert witness Federico Andreu Guzmán who indicated that, at the time of the events, “under emergency legislation, the Military Forces were granted […] powers of the Judicial Police; [in other words,] the autonomous capacity to investigate offenses, conduct searches and retentions, collect evidence […] and, in most case, [these functions were carried out by] military intelligence officers, [which] led to a great deal of abuse” and “numerous human rights violations (such as arbitrary detentions, unlawful searches, and torture).” 633 In this regard, the Court finds it pertinent to recall that the possibility of granting the Armed Forces functions aimed at the restriction of the personal liberty of civilians must respond to strict criteria of due diligence and to its exceptional nature in order to safeguard the treaty-based guarantees, bearing in mind that the specific sphere of the Military Forces cannot be reconciled with the functions that pertain to the civil authorities. 634 413. Moreover, the Court has indicated that, when arguing that a detention was made in flagrante delicto, the State has the burden of proof. 635 Thus, the Court observes that Mr. Rubiano Galvis was detained at a military checkpoint, during which they apparently found some weapons (a pistol and one or two revolvers) in the bus on which he was traveling 636 631 According to article 1 of this decree: “[a]nyone who, without the permission of the competent authority shall manufacture, store, distribute, sell, transport, provide, acquire, repair or bear personal defense weapons, ammunition or explosives, shall be detained for one to two years and these elements shall be seized.” Article 2 of the decree established that the penalty for this offense would be “applied by the Brigade, Naval Force, or Airbase Commanders, in accordance with [a] procedure [established in the same norm].” The case file does not contain a copy of Decree 1056 of 1984; however, it was cited by both the Inter-American Commission in its Merits Report and the State in its final written arguments. Cf. Merits Report (merits file, folio 120) and brief with final arguments of the State (merits file, folios 4352 and 4353). 632 This Court has established that the suspension of guarantees is an exceptional situation, “in which it is lawful for a government to subject rights and freedoms to certain restrictive measures that, under normal circumstances, would be prohibited or more strictly controlled. This does not mean, however, that the suspension of guarantees implies a temporary suspension of the rule of law, nor does it authorize those in power to act in disregard of the principle of legality by which they are bound at all times. When guarantees are suspended, some legal restraints applicable to the acts of public authorities may differ from those in effect under normal conditions. These restraints may not be considered to be non-existent, however, nor can the government be deemed thereby to have acquired absolute powers that go beyond the circumstances justifying the granting of such exceptional legal measures.” Cf. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (arts. 27.2, 25.1 and 7.6 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987. Series A No. 8, para. 24, and Case of J. v. Peru. Preliminary objection. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 27, 2013. Series C No. 275, para. 137. 633 Cf. Testimony of Federico Andreu Guzmán during the public hearing on the merits in this case, and written summary of his expert opinion (evidence file, folio 36356). 634 Cf. Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 26, 2010. Series C No. 220, para. 89. 635 Cf. Case of Gangaram Panday v. Suriname. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 21, 1994. Series C No. 16, paras. 50 and 51, and Case of Osorio Rivera and family members v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 26, 2013. Series C No. 274, para. 118. 636 Notwithstanding the foregoing, the file contains an operations report establishing that, during that month, the 143