96. Another group of tanks entered the Palace of Justice by the entry on Bolivar Plaza. At the same time, “several squadrons of law enforcement agents” entered, including police and soldiers. Also, three police helicopters circled over the area. The armed forces used machine guns, grenades, rockets, and explosives in the operation. 111 97. The President of the Supreme Court at the time, who was on the fourth floor of the Palace of Justice, tried by different means to obtain a ceasefire. He also tried unsuccessfully to communicate by telephone with the President of the Republic directly and through several people, including the President of Congress. However, his requests were broadcast by the media. 112 98. At around 5 p.m., the security forces broke down a steel door located on the terrace in order to access the fourth floor of the Palace of Justice. This was followed by a fight between the M-19 and the Army which lasted until around 2 a.m. On the morning of November 7, “the tanks began to fire again.” At 9 a.m., the President of the Republic announced by radio that “the Army now has total control of the Palace and only one guerrilla redoubt remains, so that Operation Rastrillo would begin.” 113 The Court was not informed of any further facts relating to the actions of the then President of the Republic in relation to the presumed victims in this case. On hearing this statement, the hostages who were in the bathroom between the second and third floor sent an emissary to advise that there were still civilians in the building (infra para. 102). 114 99. Between November 6 and 7, three fires occurred inside the Palace of Justice, “two lesser ones and one that totally destroyed the building and probably killed those who may have survived the gunfire and explosions on the fourth floor.” 115 In this regard, the Truth Commission added that: 111 Cf. Report of the Truth Commission (evidence file, folios 130 and 132); Report of the Special Investigative Court (evidence file, folio 30496); Judgment of the Superior Court of Bogota of January 30, 2012 (evidence file, folios 23345, 23395 and 23396), and Affidavit made on November 5, 2013, by Julia Alba Navarrete Mosquera (evidence file, folio 35904). 112 The message transmitted was: “Please, help us, stop firing! The situation is extreme; we are surrounded by members of the M-19. Please, stop firing immediately! Inform public opinion, this is urgent; it’s a matter of life or death. Do you hear me? […] We cannot talk to them unless there is an immediate ceasefire. Please, let the President finally order a ceasefire […]. We are at death’s door. You must help us. You must ask the Government to order the ceasefire. Beg the Army and the Police to stop… They don’t understand. They are pointing their guns at us. I am asking you to stop the firing because they are prepared to do anything… We are justices, employees, we are innocent… I have tried to talk to all the authorities. I have tried to communicate with the President, but he is not there. I have been unable to talk to him […].” Report of the Truth Commission (evidence file, folios 135 and 136). See also, report of the Special Investigative Court (evidence file, folios 30505 and 30506). 113 Cf. Report of the Truth Commission (evidence file, folios 148 to 150, 157 and 158); Report of the Special Investigative Court (evidence file, folio 30522), and Testimony of Samuel Buitrago Hurtado of November 21, 1985, before the 27th Criminal Investigation Judge (evidence file, folio 30621). Similarly, see the testimony of Reinaldo Arciniega Baedecker transcribed in the judgment of the 51st Criminal Court of the Bogota Circuit of April 28, 2011 (evidence file, folios 24445 and 24446). 114 Cf. Report of the Truth Commission (evidence file, folio 158), and Testimony of Samuel Buitrago Hurtado of November 21, 1985, before the 27th Criminal Investigation Judge (evidence file, folio 30622). According to the Truth Commission, the emissary informed the Secretary of the Ministry of Defense that there were still civilians in the building. The Secretary told him “don’t worry, Operation Rastrillo has been cancelled.” However, “[t]he statements of the Ministers and of the President of the Republic are consistent in affirming that they never received the message […], and did not know, at the time, that [the emissary] had come out as the bearer of a message to the Government, which means that those in charge of the military operation who received the message not only did not allow the emissary to deliver it to the Government, but never forwarded it to those to whom it was addressed.” […] After [the emissary] had left [the Palace] the Army knew where the hostages were.” Cf. Report of the Truth Commission (evidence file, folios 158, 160 and 161). 115 Cf. Report of the Truth Commission (evidence file, folio 152), and Report of the Special Investigative Court (evidence file, folio 30512) 37