6 33. In response to the petitioners’ argument on the violation of the principle of non bis in idem the State responds that there is no double jeopardy since the Court of Military Justice, on resolving the appeal, did not analyze his conduct and did not acquit him, but rather ordered annulment of the trial, and that another judge should judge him. In other words, in the military criminal justice system no judgment was handed down, which would have had to have been the case to assert that he was tried twice on the same facts. 34. In response to the petitioners’ argument on violation of the right to property of the alleged victim, due to the fact that he paid an illegal bond, the State answers that it was Gonzalo Cortéz who asked the judge to set the amount of the bond so as to secure his liberty, which was set at US$1,500, considering the that object stolen was a spare part for an airplane that is acquired abroad, by deposit in dollars at the Central Bank of Ecuador. It indicated that said bond was delivered at the Department of Finance. It further indicates that since the procedure was annulled, the bond was no longer current, and so it was ordered that it be returned. 35. The State alleges that the second detention of Gonzalo Cortéz, on February 28, 2000, was carried out by the Police and not by members of the Air Force. It indicates that on this occasion a writ of habeas corpus was filed, which turned out to be effective, and the situation was amended. It alleges that the Second Chamber of the Constitutional Court, on verifying that the arrest warrant was issued by the Third Judge for Criminal Matters of Pichincha on April 10, 2000, ordered the alleged victim’s immediate release, considering that he had been illegally detained. It argues that this shows that the State has guaranteed adequate remedies, and that they are not merely formal, but effective in practice. 36. In sum, the State argues that remedies were available to the alleged victim which he, as a matter of his own will, did not use; accordingly, one cannot attribute the non-existence of such remedies to the State.3 It alleges that it is shown that when the alleged victim requested the bond, it was granted to him; when he appealed to the Court of Military Justice the proceeding was vacated; and when he filed a writ of habeas corpus he was released. Thus those remedies proved effective in his case. The State further indicates that the alleged victim was not kept from exhausting remedies, and that there was no unwarranted delay on resolving the remedies pursued; therefore the exceptions to the rule on prior exhaustion of domestic remedies do not apply. IV. ANALYSIS OF COMPETENCE AND ADMISSIBILITY A. Competence 37. The petitioners are authorized, in principle, by Article 44 of the American Convention to present petitions to the Commission. The petition names as the alleged victim an individual person with respect to whom the Ecuadorian State undertook to respect and ensure the rights enshrined in the American Convention. As regards the State, the Commission indicates that Ecuador has been a State party to the American Convention since December 28, 1977, on which date it deposited its instrument of ratification. Therefore, the Commission is competent ratione personae to examine the petition. In addition, the Commission is competent ratione loci to take cognizance of the petition insofar as it alleges violations of rights protected by the American Convention which are said to have taken place in the territory of Ecuador, a state party to that treaty. 38. The Commission is competent ratione temporis insofar as the obligation to respect and ensure the rights protected in the American Convention was already in force for the State on In support of its argument the State cites I/A Court H.R., Blake Case, Judgment of January 25, 1998. Office of the Solicitor General. Brief received on July 11, 2000. 3