22. They further argue that given the criminal and punitive nature of the decision of the Jury that resulted in the alleged victim’s removal from office and ban from holding another judicial position, he should have had the right to a comprehensive review of the decision, which was not guaranteed, in violation of Article 8.2.h of the Convention. They allege that the treatment given the alleged victim by the judicial branch was discriminatory (Article 24 of the Convention), because it was handed down without following the precedents of the Federal Supreme Court that had been applied differently in other cases. Finally, they claim that the manner in which the court costs were determined, and the devaluation of the money that was embargoed, constituted a violation of the right to property (Article 21 of the Convention). B. Position of the State 23. The State affirms that the action of the Jury for Prosecution is political and not judicial, and that decisions cannot be appealed unless there is a violation of due process. It says that this did not violate the Convention because that instrument does not require that judges be removed by an organ of the judicial branch. According to the State, the word “tribunal” in Article 8.1 of the American Convention should not be understood only as the classical type of judicial tribunal in the State’s judicial system. A competent tribunal would be one that meets certain minimum standards concerning the right of defense recognized in the American Convention. The State says that the Jury for Prosecution meets these requirements in general, and has satisfied them in the case of Mr. Rico. 24. It says that the Jury for Prosecution acted with independence and impartiality and respected legal due process, affording Mr. Rico the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence. According to the State, the petitioners complain about the proceeding of the Jury for Prosecution but they do not indicate how the acts of that organ affected Mr. Rico’s rights. In this regard, the petitioners, according to the State, have not presented any evidence to substantiate the allegation of lack of independence and impartiality of the Jury for Prosecution and only make vague reference to external pressure. It adds that they do not offer any evidence to prove the subjective partiality of the members of the Jury for Prosecution and to prove that an attempt was made to recuse the members of that organ. In addition, the State says they did not indicate how the alleged victim’s right to be heard with due guarantees was violated by the fact that the President of Jury for Prosecution legally extended the stage of summary information by 15 days, and they do not explain how the expansion of the charges affected his right to defense. 25. It says that the alleged victim enjoyed ample opportunities to retain his position with the Jury of Prosecution in accordance with legal due process guarantees and that the petitioners are now seeking recourse to the IACHR as a court of appeal. 26. With respect to contesting the decision of the Jury for Prosecution, the State says that “there are no judicial avenues to be exhausted in the domestic environment with regard to the alleged irregularities that [the petitioners] denounce in the proceeding that culminated with [Mr. Rico’s dismissal].” However, the State says this does not mean that the alleged victim has fully and faithfully satisfied Article 46 of the Convention, inasmuch as that exhaustion of domestic remedies has occurred without observing the legal requirements established by local procedural norms, because the remedies invoked against the decision of the Jury for Enforcement were rejected for lacking the required basis, and because of the untimely challenge to the constitutionality of Article 45 of the Law of Prosecution, circumstances that mean that said domestic remedies have not been exhausted in due and proper form. The State says that the IACHR has already concluded, in the case of Ernesto Máximo Rodríguez vs. Argentina, that “if the highest court in the land has stated that an apparent lack of procedural expertise on the part of the petitioner made it impossible for him to secure a review of the penalty imposed on him, it is not for the Commission to try to determine or assess whether the Court was mistaken,” because “[t]he rules that govern procedural law reflect methodological criteria intended to ensure the orderly use of judicial actions and to make the work of the courts more efficient and effective.”3 3 IACHR, Report No. 6/98, Case 10.382. Inadmissibility. Ernesto Máximo Rodríguez. February 21, 1998, para. 62.