the Republic discretion not to apply the death penalty to a person so sentenced. Although, when deciding an amparo remedy submitted by the alleged victims in this case, the Constitutional Court stated on August 9, 1996, that Decree 159 was not in force but the clemency prerogative was; however, there was no procedure established to govern this prerogative.11 41. The Constitutional Court determined that Decree 159 was in force from April 21, 1892 to December 22, 1944. It was then in force again, with modifications, between December 23, 1944 and March 14, 1945, the day before the 1945 Constitution entered into force. Therefore, the Constitutional Court found that “the procedure set forth in Decree 159 of the National Legislative Assembly, is not in effect.” It added that the request for the commutation of the sentence is a recourse admissible for a death penalty sentence. It also concluded that the decision on such request corresponds to the President of the Republic, whose only obligation is to decide and notify the decision, without there being a procedure that the President must follow.12 42. Subsequently, on June 1, 2000, the National Congress formally annulled Decree 159 of 1892 when considering that there is no norm “that gives grounds for the Executive Organ to commute the death penalty as set forth in Decree No. 159 of the National Legislative Assembly of the Republic, due to the annulment of previous Constitution (…)13” 43. Guatemala. 3. Since then, over 17 years ago, the death penalty has not been sentenced or executed in The cases of Fermín Ramírez and Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala heard by the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights 44. In 2005 the Inter-American Court ruled on the death penalty in Guatemala and, in particular, on the reference to a dangerousness criterion to impose the death penalty for the crime of murder, and the lack of regulation for the clemency prerogative. 45. The crime of murder was defined in Article 132 of the Criminal Code. It established in the relevant section that “imprisonment of 25 to 50 years will be sentenced on the offender convicted of murder; however, the death penalty will be sentenced instead, if due to the circumstance of the acts and of the occasion, the way it was carried out and the determining motives, a greater dangerousness of the agent is revealed.”14 Decree 20-96 modified the prison sentence for the crime of murder to 25 to 50 years.15 46. In the Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala Case, the Inter-American Court analyzed, inter alia, the aforementioned paragraph with regards to the crime of murder and it indicated that the “assessment of the agent’s dangerousness implies the judge’s appreciation with regard to the possibility that the defendant will commit criminal acts in the future, that is, it adds to the accusation for the acts committed, the prediction of future acts that will probably occur.” The Court considered that the introduction of the dangerousness criterion for the criminal classification of the acts is not compatible with the freedom from ex post facto law and, therefore, is contrary to Article 9 of the Convention in connection to Article 2 of the same.16 In light of 11 Constitutional Court, File 1015-96, Jurisprudential Gazette No. 41- Amparos en Única Instancia. 12 Constitutional Court, File 1015-96, Jurisprudential Gazette No. 41-Amparos en Única Instancia. 13 See Decree No. 32-2000 published on June 1, 2000. 14 See Article 132 of Decree 17-73 of the Congress of the Republic of Guatemala, Criminal Code. 15 See Article 5 of Decree 20-96 of the Congress of the Republic of Guatemala. 16 I/A Court H.R., Case of Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 20, 2005. Series C No. 126, paras. 94 and following. 7