3 and, finally, the State has not provided a satisfactory explanation of the whereabouts of Mr. Luis Eduardo Guachalá Chimbó. 14. The petitioners argue that, since he was admitted to a public hospital, the Julio Endara Hospital, which reports directly to the Ministry of Public Health, the State has the role of protector of persons admitted thereto; therefore, it had the essential duty of protecting the alleged victim’s life and right to humane treatment. They argue that the State failed to provide this protection when it allowed the disappearance of Mr. Guachalá Chimbó, who, as a patient in a public hospital, was under its immediate custody. 15. The petitioners also allege that the judicial remedies pursued, the criminal complaint, and the writ of habeas corpus have proved fruitless, having produced no concrete results or information as to the fate of the alleged victim. They argue therefore that the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal had no effect and that the domestic law provides no means of enforcing constitutional actions. 16. They further argue that Ms. Zoila Rosario Chimbó Jarro, mother of the alleged victim, must also be considered a victim in this case, having experienced great psychological pain over her son’s disappearance. They say it has caused her extreme anguish and suffering, both because she does not know what happened to him and because she feels helpless in the face of the failure by the authorities to provide assistance and cooperation. B. Position of the State 17. The State maintains that the admission of a person to a mental health institution cannot be equated to confinement in a detention center and, therefore, the State would not bear the same obligations as it would as the protector of persons deprived of liberty in penitentiaries. 18. It objects that the petitioners are attempting to have the Inter-American Commission act as a court of review or fourth instance with respect to the criminal proceeding that was heard under national jurisdiction. It argues that the IACHR lacks competence to determine the existence of a crime and, moreover, to undertake any sort of trial. 19. The State further argues that in this case the domestic remedies have not been exhausted. It states that the petitioners should have instituted a civil suit for damages, as a means of securing reparations for an aspect of the damage caused to the alleged victim. 20. The State also maintains that if the heart of the matter is to discover and locate a person, civil law also provides for a “proceeding for presumption of death,” which would be the appropriate means of compensation for the situation reported. By way of supporting that argument it states that one of the measures that should be carried out in this proceeding is to summon the disappeared person in three publications, in the official gazette and in such newspapers as the judge considers appropriate for that purpose. 21. In its subsequent communications, the State argued that the new Constitution, which entered into force on October 19, 2009, provides new mechanisms for ensuring observance of constitutional guarantees, such as the action for noncompliance provided under the present Constitution, which would have been effective in enforcing the Constitutional Tribunal’s favorable ruling. 22. Moreover, the State argues that the petition was not presented in a timely manner, in that, since the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal dates back to September 6, 2006, and the petition was dated February 22, 2007, and received by the IACHR on March 13, 2007, eight months clearly elapsed between the final judicial decision and the receipt of the petition by the Commission. IV. ANALYSIS OF COMPETENCE AND ADMISSIBILITY A. Competence