4 in a situation of in flagrante. Both extremes are admissible, although each of them is governed by its own rules. Pursuant to its grammatical meaning, the characteristic of in flagrante generates a state of notoriety or evidence that seems to avoid the need to comply with other duties: among them, the information regarding the motives for the State’s intervention in the individual’s liberty. I think that this conclusion is erroneous. The guaranteeing nature of the norm included in Article 7(4) (justification for the State’s behavior and defense of the individual) is better attended if the obligation to inform is complied with without being subject to distinctions or deliberations that are not based on the precept nor are they necessarily based on reality. 13. The in flagrante nature –concept that, in all the rest, does not have a uniform scope within all legislations nor a unique and pacific characterization in the doctrine and jurisprudence – that is presented in a case may be enough for the person who carries out the arrest, but insufficient for who suffers it. The interpreter of the norm, who tries to find its best –and always sensible—scope, weighing in the repercussions and applications of each possible interpretation, must give it the meaning that lets it reach, in the totality or at least in the majority of the cases, taking into account the conditions of the reality, the purpose seeked. One should also keep in mind that the information on the motives for the arrest do not only inform that the State’s agent considers that certain facts have occurred, but it also implicitly means that they are illicit or reprehensible, all of them considerations that concern the justification of the State and the individual’s defense. 14. This decision made by the Court implies a change of criterion with regard to the one held in the Judgment of the Case of Acosta Calderón (Judgment of June 24, 2005, Series C, No. 129, para. 73), in which this Tribunal stated that when there someone is caught committing a crime in the act it is not necessary to inform the detainee of the reasons for his arrest. I applaud this change of criterion by the Court. I celebrate it for two reasons: because I consider that a court must be sensible to the need to modify its opinions when it considers there is reason to do so, and because in this specific case I believe that this modification is completely justified. In what remains, in this case the Court did not even mention –which would be a valid approach that could motivate reflection – if there were extraordinary reasons for the fact that the agents that carried out the arrest abstained from giving the detainee the information ordered by Article 7(4) of the Pact. III. THE MATTERS OF THE PROCEDURE 15. The Judgment of the Case of López Álvarez has also referred to the matters of the procedure --and, at its time, of the process, as is seen in this case--, which constitutes the substantive reasons why the State does what it is doing: restrict rights and liberties and act, through its authorities, in such a way that it may result in greater restrictions or deprivations, for which a justification must always be clearly established. This consideration leads to the obligation to precise with adequate means of evidence – that is, admissible, sufficient, and persuasive—the existence of the body of the crime, pursuant to the codes that so mention it, or of the elements included in the criminal definition, which must be proven, first for the trial itself (even though complete verification is not demanded at that time), and then, the judgment (which is made based on convincing evidence that prevails over a reasonable doubt).