8 tribunal “in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him” or for the determination of his rights and obligations of another nature (Article 8(1), that refers to the complete process, up to the issuing of a judgment on the merits of the case, under the epigraph “Right to a Fair Trial”); and third, “everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse” for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights (Article 25(1), regarding “Judicial Protection”). 28. Despite the diversity of the situations contemplated in each case, diversity that I am not going to discuss at this time, the three stipulations of the Convention obey to a same project for the defense of the individual’s rights: opportunity for protection, which may be useless, inefficient, or deceptive if it is not offered on time, in the understanding that “arriving on time” means operating with maximum efficiency in the protection and minimum infringement of the individual’s rights, promptness that does not mean riding roughshod, rashness, or thoughtlessness. These stipulations take into consideration the concerns that preside the aphorism “delayed justice is denied justice.” 29. The facts examined in the Judgment I am now commenting involves violations to the reasonable time in the detention (that concern Article 7(5)) and in the development of the process (which refer to Article 8(1)). In what refers to this last matter, the Court has once again brought forward the criterion it claimed some time back, taken from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, for the examination of the reasonability of the time period –complexity of the matter, procedural activity of the interested party, and behavior of the judicial authorities--, without forgetting that it is not possible to ignore the specifics of each case nor determine strict “calendars” for the universal solution of all cases. Would it be possible and recommendable to explore a fourth element, as stated infra, as of the actual infringement caused by the process on the individual’s rights and duties –that is, his judicial situation. The Tribunal also studied the dies a quo of the reasonable time in function of the act as of which the time should be computed, which is not exactly a term, because this ordinarily supposes the determination of a specific time and/ or of periods –with a starting and end point—for the realization of a specific procedure or the variation of a situation. 30. When analyzing the complexity of the matter, the Court that verified the compatibility between the State’s behavior and the stipulations of the Convention –that is, the body that practices the “control of conventionality”— must explore the circumstances de jure and de facto of the case. It is possible that the judicial analysis may be relatively simple, once the facts regarding which the lawsuit has occurred have been established, but these may be extraordinarily complex and be subject to tests that are difficult, necessarily prolonged, or of complicated, costly, risky or late recollection. The contrary may also occur: relative clarity and simpleness of the facts, in contrast with severe problems in the judicial appreciation or in their classification: different opinions, changes in the case-law, inexact legislation, reasons worthy of consideration in different or dissenting senses. 31. Likewise, it will be precise to consider the number of relationships that concur in the lawsuit: sometimes it is not only one, but multiple relationships that appear within the controversy and that must be explored, understood. Similarly, it is precise to take into account the number of participants in the material relationships and in the procedures, with their respective positions, their rights, and their interests taken to trial, as well as their reasons, and expectations. And the conditions in which the case is