tribunal as such) adopts decisions that determine the rights of the individual,”20 or that exercises “functions of a substantially jurisdictional nature.” 21 Consequently, the fundamental object and purpose sought by the provisions of Article 8(1) is that, with regard to “the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature,” the interested party has the right to “a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law” or by “State bodies (that, although they are not judges or tribunals as such) adopt decisions on the determination of the rights of the individual” or by “any State body that (although not a judge or tribunal) exercises functions of a substantially jurisdictional nature,” but, in these last hypotheses, provided that the said bodies have been granted contentious jurisdiction; in other words, they should be bodies that act as judges or tribunals, even though they are not. Thus, the most relevant part of this provision is not the reference to “the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature” or “the determination of […] rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature,” but the right of every individual to “a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law” or by another State body that, despite not being a judge or tribunal as such, has been endowed with the contentious jurisdiction and has the same conditions with regard to the said matters. On the same basis, it is not the specific matters that ensure the jurisdictional function, but rather the condition that, in the presence of a dispute about them, they are heard and decided “by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law” or by another State body that, despite not being a judge or tribunal as such, has been endowed with the contentious jurisdiction and has the same conditions with regard to the said matters. C. General conclusions Based on the above, it is clear, first, that, in exercise of the powers embodied in article 31, the Bank continued to be an administrative body or entity and that, in the matter in question, it acted as such. The judgment repeatedly considered this to be so. 22 Second, it is unquestionable that the Bank’s decisions under the provisions of this article did not consist in decisions adopted under the contentious jurisdiction by a “judge or tribunal” or by a “State body (that without being a judge or tribunal as such) adopts decisions on the determination of the rights of the individual” or that exercises “functions of a substantially jurisdictional nature.” And this is because there is no evidence in the case file that, under article 31, there had been the express or implicit intention to transform the Bank into a jurisdictional 20 Para. 118. 21 Dissenting opinion of Judges Abreu and Medina, cit. 22 Paras. 139 and 140. 7