Lucas Gonzáles and Marvin Josué Lucas González as direct victims, but rather as next of kin of the presumed victims. In addition, the Court notes that the facts described by the Commission in its Merits Report make no reference to the health situation of the next of kin of the presumed victims, or to the medical care they may have received or failed to receive, but rather refers, in general, to the violations of their mental and moral integrity allegedly suffered by the next of kin and/or circle of those closest to the direct presumed victims. In this regard, the Court considers that, based on Article 35(1) of the Rules of Procedure, and in order to safeguard the procedural balance between the parties and the State’s right to defend itself, which includes the State’s right to express its opinion, at the appropriate procedural moment, on alleged violations of the rights of the presumed victims and on the facts that underlie these violations, the representatives’ request to include the said next of kin of the presumed victims as direct victims is inadmissible. 30. Furthermore, the Court considers that the fact that this case relates to alleged violations of the rights of 49 individuals does not signify that it is a case of massive or collective violations in the terms of Article 35(2) of the Rules of Procedure, and did not exempt the representatives from identifying the presumed victims at the appropriate procedural moment. The Court notes that, since Katherine Alejandra Girón Zepeda was diagnosed with HIV in 2001, the representatives had ample time to collect the information related to her condition and present this to the Commission. Moreover, there is no evidence of any material or practical difficulties of such magnitude that they could have prevented the representatives from identifying Ms. Girón Zepeda as a presumed victim in the case. In this regard, the Court considers that, even in the hypothesis that a presumed victim is in a vulnerable situation, it is for the representatives to prove to the Court how this condition prevented the identification of a presumed victim, a situation that did not occur in this case. Consequently, the representatives’ request to include Ms. Girón Zepeda as a presumed victim in the case is inadmissible. VI.. EVIDENCE A. Admissibility of the documentary evidence 31. The Court received diverse documents presented as evidence by the Commission, the representatives and the State, or requested as helpful evidence by the Court or its President and, as in other cases, it admits those that were presented at the appropriate procedural moment (Article 57 of the Rules of Procedure)18 and the admissibility of which was neither contested nor disputed.19 The documentary evidence may be presented, in general, and according to Article 57(2) of the Rules of Procedure, together with the briefs submitting the case, with motions and pleadings, or answering the case, as appropriate, and evidence forwarded outside these procedural opportunities is inadmissible, unless the exceptions established in the said Article 57(2) of the Rules of Procedure apply (namely, force majeure or serious impediment) or it relates to a supervening fact; in other words one that occurs after the said procedural moments. Cf. Case of Barbani Duarte et al. v. Uruguay. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 13, 2011. Series C No. 234, para. 22, and Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of April 25, 2018. Series C No. 354, para. 138. 18 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No.4, para. 140, and Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of April 25, 2018. Series C No. 354, para. 137. 19 10