8. Furthermore, I find that the considerations developed in the judgment refer back to, or may be understood in the context of, the existing debate on the characteristics and nature of the right to health. On this issue, I share the opinion of the Constitutional Court of Colombia that the nature of the right to health may be understood in several ways. A first way would consist in analyzing it as a right of a “social benefit” nature, that it will be viable to protect provided it is closely and inseparably linked to rights such as to life and to personal integrity or embodied in a right of a subjective nature when the services included in the different health care plans are unknown. The right to health can also be understood as an autonomous fundamental right when it is materialized in a subjective or individual guarantee derived from human dignity. 20 On this point, I would like to underline the most recent case law of the Colombian Constitutional Court which has consolidated around the latter position after having asserted, at a previous stage, that the nature of this right was essentially that of a social benefit.21 9. The judgment of the Inter-American Court in this case advances, precisely, a similar idea when, based on the provisions of the American Convention, and of Article 26 of this instrument, it assigns to this right the characteristics of a fundamental right that would also be essential and instrumental for the exercise of the other human rights (supra para. 1). This means that the said right is peremptory for the States that signed this international instrument, which results in their duty to guarantee access to essential health services for everyone. Even though it could be found that this interpretation by the Inter-American Court is in line with or corresponds to the most recent developments of one of the region’s States, as in the case of Colombia, it is not clear whether the same conclusion could be reached for the other States. I find that the Court’s assertion is not reasonable because it is overly general and does not take into consideration the different contexts, their peculiarities, the reality of the discussions that have been held in each of those States, the different designs of the national legal and constitutional systems, or simply the real possibility of implementing such declarations. All this acquires greater relevance when it is considered that Article 26 only refers to an objective of achieving progressively the full realization of the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific and cultural standards to the extent of available resources, and does not allude to any obligation of an instantaneous nature under which it would be considered that each State had the same possibility of complying fully and instantaneously with the ESCER. Specifically, the idea and spirit that underly this provision of the Convention is that not all States are in the same position to comply with those rights and that the particular domestic circumstances and effective possibilities should be taken into account when requiring their implementation. 10. The judgment in this case refers to the progressive obligation contained in Article 26 of the Convention, specifically regarding the right to health 22 and, in this particular case, indicates that “owing to the State inaction with regard to protection of the right to health of the population of people living with HIV, despite the existence of an international obligation and State regulations, the Court concludes that the State is responsible for violating the principle of progressivity contained in Article 26 of the Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) of this instrument.”23 On this point, I would like to state that I do not share the Court’s conclusion because the arguments concerning the “State inaction” to determine whether the content of Article 26 of the Convention 20 Cf. Constitutional Court of Colombia. Judgment T-650/09. Judgment of September 17, 2009, section 3. 21 Cf. Constitutional Court of Colombia. Judgment T-650/09. Judgment of September 17, 2009, section 3. Cf. Case of Cuscul Pivaral et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 23, 2018. Series C No. 359, paras. 144 and 146. 22 Case of Cuscul Pivaral et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 23, 2018. Series C No. 359, para. 148. 23 4