obligation to the alleged victims, indicating that in 2004 the State began to pay “thanks to the intervention of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.” They added that the State has fallen behind in enforcing the decision and that, to date, “there are already more than 800 former workers who have died and the living are between 80 and 90 years old” and asked that the passage of time be taken into account as a “decisive factor” due to its impact on the aged persons. 72. The representative Meneses Huayra pointed out that the State “violated and continues to violate the right of the maritime workers to effective judicial protection, obstructing the execution of the final decision in their favor with precautionary measures that are obviously arbitrary, a situation that leaves them in a state of defenselessness and legal insecurity, impeding them from obtaining restoration of their labor rights recognized by the competent authorities.” She indicated that 28 years have elapsed since the lower court’s decision “without the beneficiaries, the former maritime workers, […] having been fully granted the additional pay increase,” as ordered in the decision of February 12, “perhaps” waiting for the beneficiaries to continue to die, as has occurred, and therefore not recognize its obligation to their heirs.” The foregoing presupposes a “violation of the pro homine” principle and a failure to recognize “the vulnerable situation of the plaintiffs who are mostly older than 70.” In addition, she mentioned that a period of 29 years, which have elapsed without the due enforcement of the decision of February 12, does not represent a reasonable time. In her final written arguments, the representative also considered that this implies a violation of Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention. 73. The State denied, in the first place, that there was “an overall or structural problem” concerning the non-compliance of domestic judicial decisions against the State. It added that it had paid “substantial amounts from the annual budget in order to comply with the payment of the obligations acquired due to the judicial decisions and the arbitral awards during the past 20 years.” It also indicated that it had fully complied with the decision of February 12 and that the alleged failure to enforce the judgment that the sub-group of workers has claimed since 2010 (and that resulted in the approval of the Expert Report) is due to “the erroneous inclusion of claims not requested in the enforcement stage of the judgment.” In addition, it indicated that the fringe benefits and other calculations were not part of the basic pay of the maritime and port workers and, therefore, were not part of the basis for the recalculation of the additional pay increase and, even less to the point, were not included within the scope of the decision of February 12. 74. The State denied that there was a failure to execute the decision because it has been shown that the State “never had the intention of evading or not assuming the obligation arising from the decision of February 12. To the contrary, the legislative measures that have been introduced attest to the State’s efforts to assume an obligation that corresponds to the private employers and in this complex context provide an appropriate solution for the maritime and port workers.” 75. The State claimed that FEMAPOR had access to a simple and effective recourse to enforce its rights and claims to achieve an adequate application of the additional pay increase, obtaining a favorable decision based on the law, a decision, moreover, that it has already complied with. The State, therefore, concluded that it did not infringe the right to an effective remedy governed by Article 25(1) and 25(2)(c) of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1(1) thereof. 76. The State also indicated that the alleged delay in executing the decision of February 12 was due to a serious budgetary problem. It also rejected the alleged “obstruction” in executing the decision and reiterated that the decision “was already executed under its own terms, in spite of the different characteristics that made its execution more complex and that limited the possibility of a swifter execution by the State.” It also noted that, although the judgment dates from 1991 and was made final by the decision of February 2, 1992, Resolution 333 issued in File 225-1990 (which approved the dissolution presented by FEMAPOR) was issued on August 20, 2003 and, therefore, it was not until 2003 that the State had a “definitive obligation.” It pointed out that the payments 20