DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE A. A. CANÇADO TRINDADE 1. I regret not to be able to concur with the decision taken by the majority of the Court in operative paragraph n. 3, and the criterion that it adopted in paragraphs 55-57, of the present Judgment on reparations in the Caballero Delgado and Santana case, to the effect of refraining the Court from seeking a review of the pertinent provisions of Colombian domestic legislation regarding the remedy of habeas corpus with a view to determining its compatibility or otherwise with the American Convention on Human Rights, and from ordering the legislative tipification of the crime of forced disappearance of persons, in the framework of the determination of the distinct measures of reparation in the circumstances of the cas d'espèce. May I proceed to an explanation of the juridical foundations of my dissenting position on the matter. 2. In order to reach the decision not to order the non-pecuniary reparations at issue, the Court invoked its previous decision in the present case (Judgment of 08 December 1995, on the merits, paragraph 62) to the effect that Colombia did not violate Article 2 of the Convention (obligation to adopt measures of domestic law), nor Articles 8 and 25 (judicial guarantees and protection). While it is by no means my intention to reopen discussion of that decision - which would not be proper at the present phase of reparations, - it should not pass unnoticed that, at the same time as the Court arrived at that decision, it also decided that "as Colombia had not redressed the consequences of the violations carried out by its agents, it failed to comply with the obligations that Article 1(1) of the Convention ... imposes on it" (ibid., paragraph 59). This is a point which does warrant consideration at the present phase of reparations, since the Court itself has expressly established the link between the general duty of Article 1(1) of the Convention and the reparations, while Article 63(1) of the Convention adds to the indemnizations other measures of reparation resulting from the duty to secure the enjoyment of the violated rights. 3. In fact, the general duty to respect and to ensure respect of the protected rights (enshrined in Article 1(1) of the Convention) has a broad scope, as this Court has already indicated in previous cases.0 The present Caballero Delgado and Santana case adds a new element for analysis, inasmuch as we are now faced with a situation, unlike that in previous cases, in which the Court has determined that there was violation of Article 1(1) (in conjunction with Articles 7 and 4) but not of Article 2 (in conjunction with Articles 8 and 25) of the Convention. Compliance with the obligation to ensure respect for the protected rights depends not only on the existing constitutional or legislative provisions - which often are not sufficient per se - but requires furthermore other measures from the States Parties to the effect of educating and empowering individuals under their jurisdiction to make full use of all the protected rights. They include the adoption of legislative and administrative measures designed to remove obstacles, fill in lacunae, and enhance the conditions for the exercise of the protected rights. 4. In the examination of a concrete case, even if a decision is reached that Article 2 of the Convention has not been violated, as the Court has done in the present Caballero Delgado and Santana case, it cannot be inferred therefrom that the States Parties would not be obliged to take the measures necessary to ensure respect for the protected rights. This general and immediate, and truly fundamental obligation, ensues 1 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of 29 July 1988, Series C, n. 4, paragraphs 163-171; Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of 20 January 1989, Series C, n. 5, paragraphs 172-180.