13. The petitioners pointed out that the harassment of Mrs. Villaseñor due to the functions she performed as a judge constituted a serious threat to her personal integrity. They said that some of those threats had been made by State agents, making the State directly responsible for them. The acts denounced included the theft of her belongings by an unknown man while she was driving, attempts by unidentified persons to break into her vehicle and home, verbal death threats outside her home, an attempt to kidnap her daughter, and death threats over the phone. 14. The petitioners added that, after they had told the authorities about the aforementioned threats, the State delayed before adopting security measures to protect Mrs. Villaseñor. They acknowledged that the State provided policemen to protect Mrs. Villaseñor and her family. They pointed out that, nonetheless, there had been several shortcomings in the provision of that protection in practice. The petitioners singled out irregularities in the way the officers were rotated as well as the lack of financial resources to pay for their meals and/or transportation. 15. The petitioners said that the right to personal liberty of Mrs. Villaseñor and her family had been violated by the State's withdrawal of security measures for them in 2013. They said that the State had taken that decision after the IACHR had suspended precautionary measures. The petitioners claimed that the State had not conducted an assessment of the risk to which the alleged victim was exposed, so that she did not know on what grounds they had withdrawn protection measures. 16. The petitioners argued that all the threats and attacks against Mrs. Villaseñor applied also to her family, thereby violating the right to protection of the family. With respect to the incident that had occurred in 2007 (see below, paragraph 80), they pointed out that the State had violated her right to have her honor respected and her dignity recognized by not investigating the facts. 17. The petitioners further claimed that in March 2004 a local newspaper had published that Mrs. Villaseñor had been declared ineligible by the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala in connection with her possible candidacy to a position as judge of the Supreme Court of Justice She maintained that there was no documentary evidence to support that claim. The petitioners added that in August 2005 another local newspaper had published a note stating, without any basis whatsoever, that Mrs. Villaseñor had received money "to favor General Efraín Ríos Montt”, by allowing him an alternative to detention. She maintained that those acts insulted her honor and dignity. 18. The petitioners also argued that the State violated Mrs. Villaseñor's and her family's rights to judicial guarantees and judicial protection. They indicated that the remedies offered were neither adequate nor effective for guaranteeing real protection for the alleged victims. They maintained that no steps were taken to identify those responsible for the various acts of violence and threats against the alleged victim and the members of her family. They added that none of the complaints lodged got beyond the initial stage, so that no progress has been made with shedding light on the facts or punishing those responsible. 19. In addition, they maintained that in 2013 Mrs. Villaseñor was improperly dismissed from her position as Supervisor General of Courts (Supervisora General de Tribunales). According to the petitioners, Mrs. Villaseñor was notified of that dismissal without a hearing and without her being able to challenge that decision. They added that she had no adequate and effective remedy to question her dismissal. In respect of this last fact, the petitioners alleged violation of the right to work and to just, equitable and satisfactory conditions of work set forth in Articles 6 and 7 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - "Protocol of San Salvador". B. Position of the State 20. The State's initial position was that the principle of equality of the parties and of their right to defense was violated during the proceedings before the IACHR. According to the State, "although the Commission indicates that [the] case is at the merits stage, (...) it is not known what proceedings have been carried out." Likewise, the State maintained that the petitioners had not explained in what way the members 3