66. States have the authority to design and organize their internal disciplinary proceedings. These proceedings should adhere to preestablished procedures that spell out the authorities and procedural rules that apply.36 This guarantee is met when the disciplinary authority originates in a law established before the proceedings in question37 and, conversely, the standard is breached when the disciplinary body lacks jurisdiction established by law. 38 Precisely because of the important role played by the bodies responsible for appointments, promotions, and disciplinary measures, and the objectivity necessary for them to act, the Commission has considered it advisable for States to establish an independent body whose functions include appointments, promotions, and dismissals.39 67. In terms of disciplinary proceedings carried out by legislative bodies, the guarantee of impartiality (Article 8(1) of the Convention) continues to be fully applicable, as the crucial point in determining the respective guarantees is the punitive nature of the powers being exercised by the respective authority, all the more so when the severity of the punishment calls for removal from office. The guarantee of impartiality implies that the members of the Jury for the Prosecution “have no direct interest in, a pre-established viewpoint on, or a preference for one of the parties, and that they are not involved in the controversy.” 40 An assessment of impartiality must consider the personal conviction and behavior of a particular judge in a given case—the subjective approach—as well as, from an objective standpoint, whether the process afforded sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect.41 The right to have an impartial tribunal constitutes a guarantee that a decision will be adopted based on reasons provided by the law and not on other criteria outside the legal framework. This is especially relevant when it comes to sanctions and is reinforced when it comes to sanctions of judges, taking into account the principle of judicial independence, as described above. 68. As to the right to have a competent tribunal previously established by law, the Commission notes that the section on the facts of the case sets out the legal framework applicable to the constitution of the Jury for the Prosecution of Magistrates. The Commission further notes that in the case at hand, the rules on composition had been previously established by law, and the steps to elect the President were clearly described. The Commission observes that the President is designated by simple majority of the members from the Supreme Court, the Council of Magistrates, the Chamber of the Senate, and the Chamber of Deputies, all of whom must be lawyers. In this regard, the right to a competent tribunal implies that objective rules on its composition must be in place before the fact and must be adhered to in the instant case, something that is not disputed. 69. With regard to the right to an independent tribunal, the Commission observes, with regard to its characteristics and composition, that the Jury for the Prosecution of Magistrates is made up of eight members, of whom four are Senators or Deputies. The Commission considers the legislative branch having a decisive say in punitive proceedings against justice operators to be problematic and to constitute, per se, a source of risk to the independent exercise of such a function, since such proceedings do not offer the proper institutional guarantees or suitability that the judiciary would.42 However, both the Commission and the Court have taken up cases in which the legislative branch has been granted substantive adjudicatory authority in punitive proceedings against judges. In those cases, the analysis as to whether or not it acted independently was conducted based on the circumstances of each specific case.43 Along these lines, the Commission observes that, beyond the risks already mentioned, the petitioner questioned the independence of the JEM in generic terms, and therefore the Commission lacks sufficient information that would indicate that the members of the JEM were subordinated or dependent upon the parties in the case or whether they lacked guarantees of tenure that could translate into a lack of independence. IACHR, Guarantees for the Independence of Justice Operators: Towards Strengthening Access to Justice and the Rule of Law in the Americas, December 5, 2013, para. 196. 37 I/A Court H.R., Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No 182, para. 53. 38 I/A Court H.R., Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of October 5, 2015, Series C No. 302, para. 221. 39 IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, para. 375. 40 I/A Court H.R., Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of November 22, Series C No. 135, para. 146. 41 See European Court of Human Rights, Case of Thomann v. Switzerland, Judgment of June 10, 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III, p. 815, para. 30. 42 IACHR, Report No. 72/17, Case 13.019, Merits, Eduardo Rico, Argentina, July 5, 2017, para. 100. 43 See, for example, Case of the Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et al.) v. Ecuador, and Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru, both of which were taken up by the Commission and subsequently by the Inter-American Court. 36 13