6. He claims that said proceeding violated Article 8 of the American Convention. In that respect, he maintains that even before the investigation against him was launched, the President of the JEM, without the vote of the other members of the Jury, first requested and then urged the alleged victim to turn over the file of the investigation into the supposedly illegal origin of the automobile owned by the Office of the President of the Republic. The petitioner contends that this is why he challenged the President of the JEM and other members, but since it is the JEM itself that rules on the challenge, it was rejected. He claims that he was also suspended from his duties by the President of the JEM, who, along with other JEM magistrates, was also being investigated by the petitioner for crimes of corruption. 7. The petitioner alleges that he had access to the draft of a final judgment that had been drawn up against him, presumably by order of the Prosecutor General of the State. He therefore made it available to the press and, on October 30, 2002, submitted the draft to a notary public for notarization. 8. He claims that the JEM issued Judgment No. 2/03 in his case on April 7, 2003, seven months after expiration of the 180-day period provided for in Law No. 1084, the same day on which the petitioner made a formal accusation and a request for parliamentary impeachment of the President of the JEM in the investigation into trafficking in vehicles. He maintains that the JEM decided to remove him from his post. He also alleges that the JEM convicted him for acts other than those denounced and that these were not discussed in the evidentiary hearing, in violation of the principle of consistency and guarantees of due process. He indicates that he filed a petition for clarification, which was rejected. He points out that, in view of that rejection, he brought an action of unconstitutionality before the Supreme Court of Justice (hereinafter “the Supreme Court” or “CSJ”) to have the JEM’s judgment suspended. 9. He states that although the judgment against him was not final, on April 28, 2003, an Interim Prosecutor for Criminal Unit No. 10 was appointed, who withdrew the investigations he had been handling. He claims that the process took place without his participation or that of the staff members of the unit, which was permanently dismantled. He alleges that the unit was searched by about 12 staff members of the Prosecutor General’s Office, who took all the files with them. He indicates that he appealed the decision on the appointment, in order to continue the investigations, but that he did not receive any response from the FGE to this or other requests. 10. He indicates that on May 16, 2003, the Supreme Court issued Interlocutory Decree No. 552, suspending the effects of the JEM’s judgment until the CSJ issued its ruling on the action of unconstitutionality. The petitioner states that on that same day, he resumed his duties as a prosecutor. 11. He states that the Supreme Court rejected the action of unconstitutionality against Judgment No. 2/03 of the JEM on June 16, 2004, through CSJ Agreement and Judgment No. 915. He claims that the only action that can be brought against a JEM judgment under domestic law is an action of unconstitutionality; therefore, he considers that domestic remedies have been exhausted. Second proceeding 12. The petitioner indicates that the Dures, a married couple who were being investigated by the alleged victim for wrongful acts against the public treasury, lodged the second complaint against him, in April 2003, claiming poor performance owing to a clear-cut bias. He states that on May 16, 2003, a few hours after having resumed his duties, the JEM decided to grant the petition and suspend him. He alleges that the JEM granted the petition in view of the suspension of the effects of Judgment No. 2/03. In this regard, he claims that this decision violated the principle of presumption of innocence and due process, since it prevented him from taking part in the proceeding. 13. He notes that in response to the JEM’s request to suspend him in this second case, on May 20, 2003, the CSJ decided that the petitioner would be suspended without pay until the final ruling was made. He maintains that due to the pressure of public opinion, the CSJ retracted its decision in part and ordered that he be paid 50 percent of his salary. He indicates that this situation affected his family. 2