14. He states that a nine-member jury acquitted him through Final Judgment No. 11-04 of April 29, 2004. He claims that he filed a petition for clarification so that the JEM would rule on costs and that on May 13, 2004, it decided that “each party should bear its own costs.” 15. The petitioner maintains that the State allowed special juries and tribunals, dependents, and interested parties to be directly involved in the preordained result of his removal. He indicates that the justice operators who judged him should have removed themselves from the proceedings, since they were being investigated by the alleged victim. In addition, the petitioner indicates that the JEM issued a ruling without providing the necessary legal reasoning; evidence of that is that the sanction decision lays out facts that are different than those in the complaints, as it includes his alleged failure to comply with Administrative Resolution No. 68/2001. The petitioner also argues that his right to presumption of innocence was violated, as the Supreme Court ruled that his wages were to be suspended, by means of a decision that could not be appealed, thus violating Article 8 of the Convention. B. State 16. The State did not submit observations during this stage, and therefore this section is based on the arguments on the merits that it put forward during the admissibility stage. 17. The State indicates that on March 12, 2002, Cristian Paolo Ortiz lodged a formal charge and requested the alleged victim’s prosecution, on grounds established in Article 14 of Law No. 1084/97 for poor performance of his duties, specifically as noted in subparagraphs (b), (g), (m), and (p). 18. It indicates that on March 18, 2002, the JEM initiated the prosecution of the alleged victim and served him with the formal charge, which he responded to on April 16, 2002, and that on May 22, 2002, the JEM ordered the opening of the evidentiary stage. It adds that the JEM admitted the documentary evidence in the form of reports and testimony offered by the complainant party as well as evidence in the form of legal instruments, testimony, confessions, and reports offered by the defense. 19. The State contends that on April 7, 2003, the JEM decided to remove Mr. Nissen Pessolani from his position of Criminal Prosecutor for poor performance of his duties, in accordance with subparagraphs (b), (g), and (n) of Article 14 of Law. No. 1084, and communicated the decision to the Chambers of the National Congress, the CSJ, and the Council of Magistrates. According to the State, the JEM considered that the alleged victim had told the complainant who had been under investigation that “in the event he does not cooperate there is the possibility of a 10-year sentence”; also, that he allegedly had “provided information and made comments and declarations to the press and third parties that went beyond the sensitive parameters of criminal investigation in its preliminary stage”; and that he allegedly had illegally ordered “an expert from the Public Prosecutor’s Office to do his work in the context of a proceeding” conducted before the JEM, which would constitute expert involvement outside of a criminal trial or proceeding for which he was responsible. 20. The State indicates that on April 10, 2003, the alleged victim filed a petition for clarification and reversal of the decision, asking that the JEM, “in the exercise of its prerogative, declare null and void the communications transmitted in relation to said resolution.” The State indicates that on April 22, 2003, the JEM decided not to grant the petitions for clarification and reversal, arguing that the preconditions for allowing the appeal did not exist, given that the appellant was requesting clarification of matters that were clearly laid out in Article 31 of Law No. 1084. The State indicates that, in view of this situation, the petitioner brought an action of unconstitutionality against that decision, which was amended on April 25 of that same year and rejected on June 16, 2004, by the CSJ. 21. The State maintains that the petitioner was accused of poor performance of his duties and that “the appropriate procedural stages” were implemented during the proceedings. It specifies that the petitioner used “the procedural devices provided by law to appeal each and every one of the decisions” of the JEM that were unfavorable to him, and therefore that the rules of due process had been followed. The State argues that the fact that the judgment went against the petitioner does not mean that the decision was arbitrary or illegal. It 3