Mina Cuero v. Ecuador, Benites Cabrera v. Peru, Valencia Campos v. Bolivia, Brítez Arce et al. v. Argentina and Nissen Pessolani v. Paraguay, I continue to believe that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hold autonomous violation of ESCERs. 6. The theory that the ESCERs are directly enforceable introduces an array of logical, legal and practical problems that inevitably undermine the reasonable predictability and legal certainty that this Court should guarantee for everyone subject to its proceedings. 7. Indeed, this procedure ignores the requirement for international obligations to arise from the prior, express consent of the States; it fails to explain that the States have not given this Court jurisdiction to rule on ESCERs, as both the Convention and the Protocol clearly state; 55 it seeks to artificially broaden the Court’s jurisdiction and it departs from the rules of interpretation of the Convention. In practice, therefore, the content of the Convention is being subverted outside the rules set in place for amending or changing it; 56 in other words, the text is put through a judicial mutation. 57 8. The first basis given for claiming that the right to work is directly enforceable is an argument of authority, citing several precedent cases, including the judgment on Lagos del Campo v. Peru and Nissen Pessolani v. Paraguay, which protects the right to work under Article 26 of the Convention. 58 9. As has been said before, claiming that the ESCERs are not directly enforceable before the Court does not amount to a denial of the existence or the paramount importance of these rights, or the fact that they are interdependent and indivisible with civil and political rights, nor does it suggest that they lack protection or should not be protected. The duty of States is to allow for the autonomy of persons to remain in force, which means that people must have access to primary goods (more broadly than those defined in the political philosophical arena of John Rawls) 59 and be able to develop their capacities, that is, have access to economic, social and cultural rights. 60 10. The States are under obligation to provide the conditions whereby people can develop their capacities and lead a decent life. Such conditions are created when States guarantee access to ESCERs, and ideally, enshrine them in their constitutions and empower their judges to deliver final, unappealable interpretations of these rights. 61 The States have been moving progressively toward making ESCERs enforceable in the domestic jurisdiction, and the Protocol of San Salvador has marked progress on the subject in the 55 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador). 56 See Articles 76(1) and 77(1) of the Convention. 57 This does not mean, of course, that the Court’s interpretations of the provisions of the Convention should not evolve and progressively clarify the scope of terms used in the text, according to the context of facts that are subsumed in the articles, as occurred, for example, in the cases on sexual orientation as a protected category, communal ownership of indigenous property, and the concept of victim in the interAmerican human rights system. 58 Cf. Paragraph 97. 59 Rawls holds that primary goods are a set of goods necessary “for the framing and execution of a rational plan of life,” such as liberty, opportunity, income, wealth and self-respect. Cf. RAWLS, John: Theory of justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts (1971), pg. 433. 60 Cf. PÉREZ GOLDBERG, Patricia: Las mujeres privadas de libertad y el enfoque de capacidades, Der Ediciones, Santiago (2021), pp. 94-109. 61 Along the same lines, one of the central postulates of the capability approach (a partial theory of social justice) is that certain basic rights (the ESCERs) should be established in national constitutions everywhere. Cf. NUSSBAUM, “Frontiers of justice: disability, nationality, species membership” (2006:314).