rule on the constitutionality of the provisions of Argentine domestic law, but rather that the claim has to do with their right to receive fair and correct reparation, like the other victims of “State terrorism.” 15. In response to the State’s argument regarding duplication of the Hanríquezcase (see infra III B) they argue that unlike this petition, in that matter the claim was for a violation of the right to equality, as Law No. 24,043 does not provide any reparation for the detentions of citizens by order of the Judicial branch. They argue that the instant petition addresses the violation of the right to equalitydue to the failure to make reparation to the victim, who was subjected to the release-under-surveillance regime after an unlawful detention. In the Hanríquez case, no claim was made referring to the release-under-surveillance regime. They argue that there is no duplicity since the facts giving rise to the allegation are different. 16. They argue that the unlawful restriction of personal liberty on the basis of the death threat to the victim and his direct family members was not repaired in timely fashion by the State and is a violation of the right to equality set forth in Article 24 of the American Convention. They argue that the violation of the right to equality invoked is based on two aspects: (i) that in the legislation the State does not expressly recognize the modality of “release under surveillance” without judicial order, for the purposes of making reparation for it; and (ii) in the judicial antecedents it was ordered that reparation be made for “release under surveillance.” 17. They argue that Law No. 24,043 recognizes situations of “release under surveillance” for the purposes of making reparation for it only when the act that ordered it emanated from the National Executive Branch (hereinafter “the Executive”), which excludes those who were in the same situation by order of the Armed Forces or its task forces. They argue that actions stemming from written decisions of the Executive can be distinguished from those arising from unwritten decisions, emanating from the same authority, which constituted a systematic practice under the military regime. That practice entailed unequal treatment, in violation of Article 24 of the American Convention. 18. As support for the alleged unequal treatment, the petitioners cite judicial precedents in which reparation was made for different situations of deprivation of liberty on orders of the Executive 1, in which the CNACAFhad considered that the aim of Law 24,043 was to grant economic compensation to persons deprived of the constitutional right to liberty, not by virtue of an order of a competent authority, but rather pursuant to acts – whatever their formal expression – that are unlawful, which emanated in certain circumstances from military tribunals and from those who exercised the Executive authority of the Nation during the last de facto government. 2 19. They also argue that in the Robastocase the CNACAFhas recognized reparations from the State for “release under surveillance” even when that measure did not emanate from the Executive. 3 They argue that the CNACAFhas established that for reasons of equity and justice, it is appropriate to include under the concept of “release-under surveillance” both those cases that occurred pursuant to the regulation of the de facto government and those others in which the person was subjected to a state of control and dependence without guarantees – or without the full enjoyment of guarantees – that can be shown in the facts, which represented a comparable impairment to their liberty. 1 The petitioners cite the judgments in "NORO, Horacio José" (1997), "ARRASTIA MENDOZA"(1998), "BUFANO, Alfredo" (1998), "QUIROGA, Rosario Evangelina" (2000), and the "YOFRE" case. 2 CNACAF Judgment, "BUFANO, Alfredo,"February 18, 1998. They indicate that the CNACAF ruled that the Supreme Court “… has established, with referral for the opinion of the Solicitor General of the Nation, that the aim of Law 24,043 was to grant economic compensation to persons deprived of the constitutional right to liberty due to illegitimate acts – whatever their formal expression – emanating in certain circumstances from military tribunals or from those who were running the federal Executive branch during the last de facto government ….” The petitioners cite CNACAF judgment of the 3rd Chamber of November 28, 2003, in File No. 143,625/2002 captioned "ROBASTO Jorge Enrique re: Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. – Article 3 of Law No. 24,043 (Resolution No. 257/02).” 3