13 to avail itself of remedies that the procedural system affords, such as interrogation of the professional who prepared the expert report; nor was there any oath or solemn declaration pledging to tell the truth, and so on…" The State argued that the expert report was "extemporaneous evidence, as it was not furnished with the original application" filed by the next of kin and was "put together and drafted in Lima, although the subjects of the report [the Castillo-Páez family] were not in Peru at the time it was issued." To support its argument, the State supplied evidence in the form of a record of the Castillo-Páez family’s emigration. It also noted that the appendix to the expert report was unsigned. The State claimed to have had no knowledge of the sworn affidavits and expert report until the June 9, 1998 public hearing. However, it later corrected itself, stating that the affidavits had been sent to the State by note of June 6, 1998. The Secretariat clarified that the case file showed that the "sworn affidavits" made by the victim’s next of kin had been sent to the State on June 11, 1998. * * * GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON EVIDENCE 36. Under Article 43 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure: Items of evidence tendered by the parties shall be admissible only if previous notification thereof is contained in the application and in the reply thereto […] Should any of the Parties allege force majeure, serious impediment or the emergence of supervening events as grounds for producing an item of evidence, the Court may, in that particular instance, admit such evidence at a time other than those indicated above, provided that the opposing party is guaranteed the right of defense. 37. It must be understood that with the justified exceptions indicated above, at the first opportunity they have to make their case during the reparations stage of the proceedings the parties are to indicate what evidence they will offer. Under Article 44 of its Rules of Procedure, the Court has discretionary authority to request from the parties certain additional evidence that it deems helpful, relevant, or useful. However, this does not mean that the parties will have another opportunity to expand upon or add to their reparations arguments, unless the Court so permits. In the instant case, the procedural opportunity for submission of evidence and arguments was specified in the President’s orders of January 28 and 29, 1998 (supra 6). 38. The Court has always held that proceedings before the Inter-American Court have their own unique characteristics that distinguish them from domestic legal proceedings, without detriment to the principles of legal certainty and the procedural equality of the parties (cf. Cayara Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of February 3, 1993. Series C No. 14, para. 42; Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of January 21, 1994. Series C No. 17, para. 44, and Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations, Judgment of November 27, 1998. Series C No. 42, para. 38. Given that fact, this Court has always been flexible with the standard of proof it applies for receiving evidence. International jurisprudence has recognized the power of the courts to weigh the evidence freely, but has consistently avoided a rigid rule regarding the amount of proof necessary to support a judgment (cf. Corfu Channel, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, paras. 29-30 and 59-60; Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 127; Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment