22 no specific evidence concerning this issue in the admissibility reports that the Commission adopted with regard to each of the cases considered individually”; (f) “It was clear, during the proceedings before the Commission […] that the existing domestic remedies for the protection of the rights and freedoms, whose violation is the subject of the application, are absolutely appropriate, have always been available to the alleged victims and their next of kin, and have been processed by the competent authorities in the way and in the terms established by domestic norms”; and (g) The remedies under domestic law for the protection of the rights and freedoms whose violation is the subject of the application “are still being processed. Decisions have already been handed down in some of them, which have protected the rights of the alleged victims and their next of kin, and final decisions are awaited in others.” The Commission’s arguments 101. that: Regarding the preliminary objection filed by the State, the Commission stated (a) The Court should proceed “to examine the [preliminary objection] together with the merits of the case; reject it as inadmissible and groundless […] and reaffirm its jurisdiction to examine the merits of the case”; (b) “The procedural opportunity to file objections concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies is when [the Commission] is examining admissibility”; (c) “The content of the admissibility decisions adopted [by the Commission] should not be substantially re-examined and should be considered final”; (d) “Only the remedies that are adequate for repairing the alleged violations must be exhausted. To be adequate, the function of these domestic remedies must be appropriate to protect the legal situation that has been violated”; (e) “The alleged facts […] involve the alleged violation of fundamental non-derogable rights, such as the right to life and humane treatment, which, under domestic law, translate into crimes that may be prosecuted de oficio and, therefore, it is this procedure, promoted by the State itself, that must be [exhausted]”; (f) “Rulings of a disciplinary nature do not satisfy the obligations established in the Convention concerning judicial protection, because they are not an effective and sufficient way to prosecute, sanction and repair the consequences of the extrajudicial execution of individuals protected by the Convention”; (g) “Regarding the exhaustion of the administrative jurisdiction, […] this type of proceedings is exclusively a mechanism for supervising the State’s