32 was difficult to find and assist them. Some of the help was provided in coordination with the Social Solidarity Network. The Antioquia Governor’s Office, through the security councils, coordinated the actions of law enforcement personnel, and promoted the work with the Offices of the Prosecutor General, the Ombudsman and the Attorney General. This is what the Governor called REDIS (Safety Information Networks), in which not only of members of law enforcement bodies participated, but also control and investigation agencies. EXPERT EVIDENCE a) Expert evidence proposed by the representatives 1. Bjorn Pettersson, independent human rights consultant, particularly on the issue of internal displacement Based on his many interviews and field visits, he concluded that: (a) the authorities did not adopt preventive measures, even though they knew that paramilitary groups were raiding Ituango; (b) the Ituango massacres were perpetrated by paramilitary groups acting in conjunction with the Colombian Armed Forces or, at least, with the latter’s acquiescence or tolerance, and (c) a large number of people were forced to displace without emergency assistance, or State support for resettlement and voluntary reintegration. The acts allegedly perpetrated by paramilitary groups, such as mutilation and other tortures following by extrajudicial execution, were carried out with “extreme cruelty.” The paramilitary group involved remained in the area for several days, receiving military and logistic support from the Colombian Armed Forces. Regarding the forced displacement, according to local laws and also international norms, the Colombian State was obliged to: (a) prevent the massacre and displacement; (b) investigate the violent acts, and prosecute and punish those responsible; (c) protect the displaced from additional violations; (d) provide the displaced with humanitarian assistance as regards nutrition, housing, health care, education and clothing, and (e) ensure their safe and voluntary return home and local reintegration, or resettlement in another part of the country. The displaced population did not have access to health care, nutrition, housing and educational services. The measures taken by the State to help the displaced return to their original communities were implemented without guaranteeing the minimum conditions of security and before the causes of the displacement had been eliminated. The possibility of the displaced inhabitants of Ituango returning was not feasible owing to the presence of paramilitary groups in the north of Antioquia, and the collaboration of certain sectors of the Colombian Armed Forces. The main mechanisms for implementing the State’s obligations towards the displaced are: (a) the competent authorities have the obligation to establish ways and means of ensuring safe and acceptable conditions for the voluntary return of the displaced to their homes or their voluntary resettlement in another part of the country and (b)