5 4. 45. [. . .] the Commission enjoys discretionary, but by no means arbitrary, powers to decide in each case [. . .] (Velásquez Rodríguez Case, supra 1, para. 45; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, supra 1, para. 50; and, Godínez Cruz Case, supra 1, para. 48.) 5. 29. [. . .] In exercising these powers, the Court is not bound by what the Commission may have previously decided; rather, its authority to render judgment is in no way restricted. The Court does not act as a court of review, of appeal or other similar court in its dealings with the Commission. Its power to examine and review all actions and decisions of the Commission derives from its character as sole judicial organ in matters concerning the Convention. This not only affords greater protection to the human rights guaranteed by the Convention, but it also assures the States Parties that have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court that the provisions of the Convention will be strictly observed. (Velásquez Rodríguez Case, supra 1, para. 29; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, supra 1, para. 34; and, Godínez Cruz Case, supra 1, para. 32.) IV. Conclusions and Vote 1. That the petitioner complied with the exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement by presenting a writ of habeas corpus, the final decision on which was communicated to him on January 14, 1987. 2. That the period of six months referred to in Article 46(1)(b) of the Convention expired on July 14, 1987. 3. That the Commission received the petition on September 1, 1987, to wit, more than a month after the expiration of the six-month period. 4. That, according to the Convention and the Statute of the Commission, this six-month period is not of a procedural nature since it is contained in the part of the Convention relating to II. Means of Protection - Chapter VII. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights - Section 3. Competence. Consequently, I reiterate that this period has been established in order to determine the jurisdiction of the Commission, an aspect that, according to the Preamble of the Convention, constitutes the essential purpose of the treaty and cannot be modified by the organs entrusted with its implementation, that is to say, by the Commission and the Court. 5. The Commission did not observe and, in fact, failed to comply with the Convention, its Statute and its Regulations, none of which grant it arbitrary or discretionary powers in the area of jurisdiction, as can be seen from the applicable normative provisions transcribed above. 6. That in view of the fact that the Commission admitted the petition or complaint outside of the period established by the Convention, a situation that no declaration of the parties can validate since it is a matter of nonobservance of an express norm of the Convention, there is no basis for the Court to attach the importance it does to the note of the Government of Peru dated September 29, 1989, appearing on page 194 of the main case file, in its judgment on the preliminary objections in the instant case, which was adopted by majority vote.