4 The Court need not analyze here the nature of the time limit set by Article 51(1), nor the consequences that would result under different assumptions were such a period to expire without the case being brought before the Court. The Court will simply emphasize that because this period starts to run on the date of the transmittal to the parties of the report referred to in Article 50, this offers the Government one last opportunity to resolve the case before the Commission and before the matter can be submitted to a judicial decision. (Velásquez Rodríguez Case, supra 1, para. 62; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, supra 1, para. 62; and, Godínez Cruz Case, supra 1, para. 65.) 3. 63. Article 51(1) also considers the possibility of the Commission preparing a new report containing its opinion, conclusions and recommendations, which may be published as stipulated in Article 51(3). This provision poses many problems of interpretation, such as, for example, defining the significance of this report and how it resembles or differs from the Article 50 report. Nevertheless, these matters are not crucial to the resolution of the procedural issues now before the Court. In this case, however, it should be borne in mind that the preparation of the Article 51 report is conditional upon the matter not having been submitted to the Court within the three-month period set by Article 51(1). Thus, if the application has been filed with the Court, the Commission has no authority to draw up the report referred to in Article 51. (Velásquez Rodríguez Case, supra 1, para. 63; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, supra 1, para. 63; and, Godínez Cruz Case, supra 1, para. 66.) IV. Conclusions and Vote 1. The Commission had the opportunity to submit case 10.078 to the Court until September 11, 1990. 2. Since the request for an extension presented by the Government of Peru is not contemplated in the normative provisions in force, it was not only inadmissible but also relied erroneously on Article 34(6) of the Regulations of the Commission, a provision that governs a different stage of the proceedings and is not here applicable. The Commission should have denied the request and pointed out that the period of three months still had 20 days to run before its expiration. And furthermore, it lacked authority to grant an extension of this term fixed in a treaty. 3. In extending a period fixed by the Convention, the Commission not only exceeded the bounds of its jurisdiction, but also, by so doing, placed itself in a position that made it legally impossible to submit the case to the Court. It did not, however, lose its power to sanction Peru through the publication of its report. 4. The authority to extend or prolong the 90 day period is not granted to the Commission in any article of the Convention, nor does the latter contemplate the States requesting such an extension.