fiscal or any other nature,” that determination would not be included in the said jurisdiction unless the law had provided that it should be made by a judge or tribunal. Furthermore, precisely because the non-contentious or voluntary jurisdiction is closely connected to the institution of judge or tribunal (outside of which it is not justified and does not exist), assigning to another body, particularly an administrative entity, the hearing and settlement of matters that are generally included in that jurisdiction, such as “the determination of (the) rights and obligation of a civil, labor, fiscal or any other nature,” would not be conferring on the said administrative body or entity a different jurisdiction to that which it already possesses as such, but rather incorporating a new element into its jurisdiction. From the above it can be inferred that, only when an administrative body or entity has clearly been granted the authority to decide disputes concerning specific administrative matters, which would normally fall within its own sphere, such as those relating to “the determination of (the) rights and obligation of a civil, labor, fiscal or any other nature,” would this be admissible under the contentious jurisdiction which has thus been granted to it even though it is neither judge nor tribunal. In such cases, it will act and be considered as such, and will be a “State body (that, without being a judge or tribunal as such) adopts decisions that determine the rights of the individual,”20 or that exercises “functions of a substantially jurisdictional nature.”21 Consequently, the fundamental object and purpose sought by the provisions of Article 8(1) is that, with regard to “the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature,” the interested party has the right to “a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law” or by “State bodies (that, although they are not judges or tribunals as such) adopt decisions on the determination of the rights of the individual” or by “any State body that (although not a judge or tribunal) exercises functions of a substantially jurisdictional nature,” but, in these last hypotheses, provided that the said bodies have been granted contentious jurisdiction; in other words, they should be bodies that act as judges or tribunals, even though they are not. Thus, the most relevant part of this provision is not the reference to “the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature” or “the determination of […] rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature,” but the right of every individual to “a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law” or by another State body that, despite not being a judge or tribunal as such, has been endowed with the contentious jurisdiction and has the same conditions with regard to the said matters. On the same basis, it is not the specific matters that ensure the jurisdictional function, but rather the condition that, in the presence of a dispute about them, they are heard and decided “by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law” or by another State body that, despite not being a judge or tribunal as such, has been endowed with the contentious jurisdiction and has the same conditions with regard to the said matters. C. General conclusions 20 Para. 118. 21 Dissenting opinion of Judges Abreu and Medina, cit. 6