authenticity of which was not questioned, exclusively to the extent that it finds them pertinent and useful to determine the facts and their possible juridical consequences. 23. The Court observes that, in its briefs with observations of May 6 and June 15, 2011 (supra para. 13), the State submitted observations on the final written arguments of the Commission and the representatives, as well as additional arguments and evidence that the Court had not requested. In their observations of June 15, 2011, the representatives asked that Uruguay’s observations on its final written arguments and those of the Commission be “rejected as inadmissible because no procedural opportunity had been established for their presentation.” In this regard, the Court notes that the parties were asked to submit observations on the information and attachments forwarded by the parties “in response to the questions raised by the judges of the Court at the end of the public hearing [...] and by the President of the Court in a note of the Secretariat dated March 8, 2011.” The parties were also advised that “[a]ny other additional argument w[ould] not be considered by the Court.” Hence, the Court finds that said additional arguments submitted by the State in its briefs of May 6 and June 15, 2011, are not admissible and, accordingly, the Court will not take them into consideration in its decision. 24. In addition, the Court takes note that, on February 4, 2011, the representatives forwarded a decision of the United Nations Human Rights Committee adopted on October 19, 2010, in relation to an individual petition filed by Juan Peirano Basso, and asked that “it be added as evidence,” because “it explained clearly some essential aspects that were relevant to prove the violation of [the] rights [of the alleged victims].” The representatives indicated that, since they had presented their pleadings and motions brief in September 2010, they “did not have access to this document at the time, which was only adopted in October that year.” Regarding this documentary evidence, the State indicated that, “under the provisions of Article 57(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court […], it was inadmissible, because the document bears no relation to the purpose of these proceedings [since] the facts to which the said decision refers are unrelated to the purpose of these proceedings”; and that such “evidence is timebarred.” In this regard, first, the Court reiterates what it indicated above, when it stated that it is for this Court to determine in the respective prior consideration (infra paras. 32 to 41) whether or not the facts related to this document are part of the factual framework of the case. Second, the Court finds that, since the said decision of the United Nations Human Rights Committee was adopted after the representatives had submitted their pleadings and motions brief, the aforementioned documentary evidence complies with the formal requirements for its admissibility as evidence concerning a supervening fact under Article 57(2) of the Rules of Procedure, and incorporates it into the body of evidence to be assessed according to the rules of sound judicial discretion and bearing in mind the objections raised by the State. 25. The representatives observed that the State’s presentation of the decision of the Supreme Court of Justice deciding the remedy of cassation in the case of the representative and alleged victim María del Huerto Breccia “is time-barred, since it was submitted outside the time frame that the Court granted the State for this purpose.” In this regard, the Court observes that this evidence was submitted by the State in response to a request by the President that it forward a copy of the domestic judgments that had been delivered following the presentation of its answering brief (supra para. 11). Although the State submitted this judgment seven days after the time limit to submit the helpful evidence had expired, this was because the judgment was handed down several days after the expiry of the time limit. In addition, the Court has verified that the said domestic judgment was delivered five months after the State submitted its answering brief on November 26, 2010 (supra para. 6). Based on the foregoing, the Court considers that the said documentary evidence complies with the formal requirements for its admissibility as evidence on a supervening fact, in accordance with 9