It is also a fact of the case that an appeal before the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal was admissible against the decisions adopted by the Bank under article 31, and this was filed by some of the interested parties.7 Lastly, it should also be recalled that the judgment “notes that, in this case, no violation has been alleged regarding the creation of the special administrative procedure under article 31 […], or with regard to the requirements established in this norm in order to benefit from it” and that, in the instant case, what must be “determined is whether, in the procedures in which the said norm was applied, the guarantees of due process and judicial protection […] were violated,”8 and it concluded “that the special administrative procedure was ineffective, in light of what it had to determine […], because the Central Bank made an incomplete analysis of the merits of the petitions, which meant that the State violated the substantive sphere of the right to be heard protected by Article 8(1) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of the 539 persons who filed a petition under article 31 of Law 17,613, indicated in the Annex on victims to this judgment.”9 It is precisely with regard to the meaning and scope that the judgment accords to the provisions of this norm, thus making it applicable to the corresponding decisions taken by the Bank, that I present this dissenting opinion. B. Interpretation of Article 8(1) of the Convention Based on the foregoing, it is now appropriate to analyze the text of the said Article 8(1) of the Convention (hereinafter, Article 8(1)), which reads: “Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.” There are several ways of interpreting this article. One of them, which this opinion shares, is the one stated in a dissenting opinion issued in another case,10 to the effect that this “provision seeks to protect the right of the individual to have disputes arising between two parties, whether private individuals or State bodies and whether or not they refer to human rights issues, decided with the most complete judicial guarantees. This provision is the guarantee, par excellence, of all human rights and a requirement sine qua non for the existence of a State in which the rule of law prevails. We consider that its importance should not be trivialized by applying it to situations that, in our opinion, cannot be the focus of this regulation.” Always according to the said dissenting opinion, “[a] basic presumption for the application of this right is that the State has failed to respect a right or that the State has not provided a remedy should an individual fail to respect a right,” so that “[w]hen a right has been denied, the Convention establishes (under Article 8) the right that a body with the characteristics indicated in this article shall decide the dispute; in other words, 7 Para. 103. 8 Para. 115. 9 Para. 142. 10 Dissenting opinion of Judges Alirio Abreu Burelli and Cecilia Medina Quiroga, Case of Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile. Judgment on merits, reparations and costs of September 19, 2006. 3