5 c. Military Criminal Process On February 27, 1989, preliminary proceedings of inquiry before 26th Court of Military Criminal Investigations were initiated to determine those responsible for kidnapping Isidro Caballero-Delgado and María del Carmen Santana. This investigation was initiated under orders from Lieutenant Colonel Diego Velandia, Commander of the Santander Infantry Battalion, because of the publication of newspaper articles which "directly and in a general manner accuse soldiers of the Morrinson Base of having apprehended Isidro Caballero-Delgado and María del Carmen Santana on February 7, 1989 in the District of Guaduas. They remain disappeared." As part of this investigation, personnel from the base who were in service on the day of the events, were questioned. Several inspections were also conducted to determine if, on February 7, 1989, operations by a troop from the Morrison Base had been ordered and executed. María Nodelia Parra was summoned to render sworn testimony about the events investigated, but she did not appear. They also requested and added to the file those documents relating to investigations completed by the Office of Criminal Investigation of Valledupar and the Municipal Representative of San Alberto. On June 6, 1989, the 26th Court mentioned above, decided to suspend the preliminary investigation into the disappearance of Caballero-Delgado and Santana and to close the proceedings provisionally, without prejudice, so that if a person were later accused it could continue the investigation. One cannot attribute to the Republic of Colombia negligence or indolence in the investigation. Moreover, the fact that those implicated have been absolved in the first proceeding does not signify that there is "collusion" between them and the Public Power given that the rules that criminal judges must apply require that doubts be resolved in favor of the accused. Nor has it been demonstrated that the judges were not independent. *** Except in reference to the duty to make reparations, this judgment of the Court lacks legal analysis proving that the Republic of Colombia violated the Convention. That is to say that the Court has made a pure and simple application of the risk theory which goes beyond not only what the States accepted on giving their consent to the Convention but also the previously cited case law of the Court. The duty to make reparations is not autonomous in either the domestic or the international order. That is to say, to impose reparations it is first necessary to demonstrate a violation of the Convention. The Court has already stated in the Velásquez Rodríguez and Godínez Cruz Cases that "[t]he State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent . . . to carry out a serious investigation . . . to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation." (Ibid., para. 174 and para. 184, respectively.) This sequence is not accidental. Therefore, there cannot be a violation of the Convention due to the failure to make reparation, unless that reparation arises from an injury due to another violation. Article 63(1) of the Convention recognizes it in this way and provides that: