34 114. As was stated at the time, the effective judicial remedy under Article 25 of the Convention is broad and general to protect the rights contained in the Constitution, the legislation, or the American Convention; while the right to appeal the judgment to a higher court set forth in Article 8(2)(h) is aimed at the review of a decision reached in the context of a process that can include the determination of rights and obligations of a criminal nature, as well as of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature. 166 While the latter is encompassed within the scope of due process, the first one is within the dimension of the right to the guarantee of fundamental rights of both constitutional and conventional sources. 115. With respect to the right to appeal the judgment to a higher court or tribunal enshrined in Article 8(2)(h), the Inter-American Court has consistently avoided any confusion between this recourse and the provisions of Article 25 of the American Convention, which provides for the right to an effective judicial recourse. That is, the InterAmerican Court has identified that the remedy set forth in Article 25 of the American Convention is not the same as the process of appeal provided for in Article 8(2)(h) of the same treaty.167 From the foregoing, the differences between the remedies that are provided for both in Article 8(2)(h), as well as Article 25 of the American Convention, seem, at least, prima facie evident. However, undoubtedly, there exists a gray area where these distinctions may not be as easy to realize, especially when you take into account the broad range of expectations that the recourse framed in Article 25 of the Convention can have, in comparison with the diverse claims that can be substantiated in domestic jurisdictions. In my opinion, the case of Liakat Ali Alibux is situated on that assumption. 116. As can be inferred from the Interlocutory Resolution of the High Court of Justice of Suriname, at the heart of the arguments raised by Mr. Alibux was the lack of a process of appeal in the proceedings that were ongoing, but it was also reasonably clear that his claim was related to the illegality, unconstitutionality, and non-conformity with the Convention of the inexistence of such recourse. Likewise, this objection raised by Mr. Alibux was neither in legal nor factual terms in the eyes of international law an appeal, since such remedy did not exist in the legislation of Suriname at the time of the facts, and because the High Court of Justice did not want to give it that effect. In any case, the recourse sought by Mr. Alibux could have been classified within that broader sphere of judicial protection afforded by Article 25 of the American Convention. As such, the substantiation of this recourse could have been evaluated from this perspective, and not as an issue in the Judgment that was subsumed within the right to appeal the judgment embodied in Article 8(2)(h) of the Convention. 117. In controversies of this sort, to subsume such recourses within the sphere of Article 8(2)(h) denies, from the get-go, the need of access to a judicial remedy of control that can deal with constitutional and conventional questions when the absence of certain specific recourse provided for in the American Convention is anticipated. Moreover, this can also result in ignoring the need to adopt accurate practices of control for conformity with the 166 Cf. Case of de la “White Van” (Paniagua Morales et al.) V. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of March 8, 1998. Series C No. 37, para. 149. 167 See, among others, Case of Vélez Loor V. Panamá. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 3, 2010. Series C No. 218, para. 178; Case of Barreto Leiva V. Venezuela. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 17, 2009. Series C No. 206, para. 100 to 103; and Case of Mohamed V. Argentina. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 23, 2012. Series C No. 255, paras. 118 and 119.