7 After transcribing Article 45(2) of the Regulations of the Commission, the Court stated: The foregoing means that the Commission enjoys discretionary, but by no means arbitrary, powers to decide in each case whether the friendly settlement procedure would be a suitable or appropriate way of resolving the dispute while promoting respect for human rights. (Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, para. 45; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Preliminary Objections, para. 50; and, Godínez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections, para. 48.) 27. The Court has held that the Commission has no arbitrary powers in this regard. The intention of the Convention is very clear as regards the conciliatory role that the Commission must perform before a case is either referred to the Court or published. Only in exceptional cases and, of course, for substantive reasons may the Commission omit the friendly settlement procedure because the protection of the rights of the victims or of their next of kin is at stake. To state, as the Commission does, that this procedure was not attempted simply because of the “nature” of the case does not appear to be sufficiently well-founded. 28. The Court believes that the Commission should have carefully documented its rejection of the friendly settlement option, based on the behavior of the State accused of the violation. 29. Nevertheless, the Commission’s omission did not cause irreparable harm to Colombia because, if it did not agree with the Commission’s position, that State had the power to request the friendly settlement procedure pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 45 of the Commission’s Regulations, which provides that: At the request of any of the parties, or on its own initiative, the Commission shall place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned, at any stage of the examination of a petition, with a view to reaching a friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of respect for the human rights recognized in the American Convention on Human Rights. 30. An essential part of any friendly settlement procedure is the participation and will of the parties involved. Even if one were to interpret the provisions of the Convention literally and to ignore the Regulations of the Commission, the latter can do no more than suggest to the parties that they enter into conversations aimed at reaching a friendly settlement. The Commission cannot decide the matter, however, since it lacks the power to do so. The Commission must promote the rapprochement but is not responsible for the results. If agreement is reached, the Commission must make sure that human rights have been properly defended. If one of the parties is interested in a friendly settlement, it is free to propose it. In the case of the Government and keeping in mind the object and purpose of the treaty -that is, the defense of the human rights protected therein- such a proposal could not be interpreted as an admission of responsibility but, rather, as good faith compliance with the Convention’s purposes. The Court finds it unacceptable for the Government to argue as a preliminary objection that the Commission did not implement the peaceful settlement procedure, considering that it enjoyed that very same power under the provisions of the Commission’s Regulations. One cannot demand of another an action that one could have taken under the very same conditions but chose not to. 31. For the above reasons, the Court rejects this preliminary objection. VI