9 38. The Commission, for its part, maintains that the Government’s assertion that the threemonth period governed by Article 51(1) of the Convention must be considered to be obligatory in character is incorrect because the Court, in its judgment of December 11, 1991, on preliminary objections in the Neira Alegría et al. Case, found that since that period may be extended it cannot be deemed to be obligatory. The Commission adds that the extension occurred because the Government requested the reconsideration of Report Nº 31/91 before the expiration of the period fixed in that report. On the other hand, this petition cannot be dismissed by arguing that it was not applicable because a request for reconsideration can only be interposed by States that are not Parties to the Convention. In ruling on the preliminary objections in the Velásquez Rodríguez Case, the Court found that although the request for reconsideration is not contemplated in the Convention and Article 54 of the Commission’s Regulations reserves that proceeding for States that are not Parties, it does conform to the spirit and aims of the Convention (Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, supra 26, para. 69; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Preliminary Objections, supra 26, para. 69; and, Godínez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections, supra 26, para. 72). In addition, according to the Neira Alegría et al. Case, the basic principles of good faith that govern the international law of human rights dictate that one may not request something of another and then challenge the grantor’s powers once the request has been complied with (Neira Alegría et al. Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of December 11, 1991. Series C No. 13, para. 35). 39. The Commission argues that the Government’s assertion that the request for reconsideration was submitted after the expiration of the 90- day term beginning on the date of approval of Report Nº 31/91, that is, on September 26, 1991, is incorrect. According to the Commission, that calculation is erroneous because the report was transmitted to the Government on October 17 of that year and that is the date from which the period starts to run. Furthermore, since the reconsideration request was presented on January 16, 1992, it was introduced one day prior to the expiration of the period at issue, based on the case law of the Court which has determined that the 90 days shall begin to run on the date of transmittal of the relevant recommendations to the Government in question. 40. In the Commission’s judgment, Colombia’s argument that the reconsideration was rejected in February 1992, is also not sound, since the decision made on that date resulted in the suspension of the adoption of Report Nº 31/91 as final. Consequently, the stage governed by Article 50 of the Convention had been neither abandoned nor surpassed. The phrase about the report not having become ineffective means that it had not been revoked. In his clarification of February 28, 1992, the President of the Commission advised the Government that the suspension of the report was intended to provide Colombia with a new opportunity to comply with the recommendations contained therein. 41. The Commission also considers unacceptable the Government’s argument that the February 1992 decision implied that the proceedings relating to the document contemplated in Article 51 of the Convention had already begun and that, therefore, the opportunity to refer the case to the Court had been lost. According to the Commission, that decision merely granted an extension to decide on the issue; that decision was made by the Commission during its session of September 1992. 42. This objection comprises several issues. First, the Court does not share the Government’s position that the period established under Article 51(1) of the Convention is obligatory in character, for this Tribunal has held that it may be extended (Neira Alegría et al. Case, Preliminary Objections, supra 38, paras. 32-34).