44. The State of Costa Rica argues that the individual victims were identified too late, and that their relationship to the facts denounced in the petition was not mentioned. It maintains that the Commission should declare that it lacks jurisdiction ratione personae to examine the petition, because no real victims were identified in the initial petition. The State also argues the Commission's lack of jurisdiction ratione personae with respect to the companies Costa Rica Ultrasonografia S.A. and Instituto Costarricense de Fertilidad. The petitioner, however, argues that he submitted the list of resume victims only on December 24, 2002, because they had chosen confidentiality out of fear of interference by the press in their personal life. 45. The requirements of admissibility for a petition must generally be examined at the time the Commission decides on admissibility.1 Thus, the occasion of presenting the petition and that of declaring admissibility are distinct. Article 33 of the IACHR's rules of procedure, for example, empowers the Commission to ask the petitioner to fulfill the requirements omitted in the petition, when the Commission considers that the petition is inadmissible or incomplete. 2 46. To accept the argument of the State that the complaint should be inadmissible because the individual victims were not identified in the initial petition, although they were subsequently identified, would imply a formalistic decision inconsistent with protecting the human rights enshrined in the Convention, and would place the presumed victims in a position of defenselessness. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has declared that it is a commonly accepted principle that the procedural system is a means for seeing that justice is done, and that it is not sacrificed for the sake of mere formalities. 47. Similarly, the failure to identify the individual victims could in no way diminish the Costa Rican State's awareness of the situation described in the petition, since that situation arose in relation to a judgment of the Constitutional Chamber of Costa Rica, prohibiting the practice of in vitro fertilization in the country. 48. The Commission therefore considers that it has jurisdiction ratione personae for those persons covered by the definition of persons in Article 1.2 of the Convention. 49. With respect to the companies Costa Rica Ultrasonografia S.A. and Instituto Costarricense de Fertilidad, the Commission affirms its practice and doctrine established in the cases of Banco de Lima3, Tabalacera Boqueron 4, Mevopal S.A. 5 and Bendeck Cohdinsa6, in which it declared that it does not have jurisdiction ratione personae to examine a petition submitted before the Commission by a legal person, because these are excluded from the protection of the Convention. The present petition contains no elements that would justify an amendment to the Commission's jurisprudence. 50. Thus, for purposes of admissibility, the Commission decides that it has jurisdiction ratione personae with respect to the presumed victims cited above, but not with respect to the companies Costa Rica Ultrasonografia S.A. and Instituto Costarricense de Fertilidad. 2. Jurisdiction ratione materiae 51. The Commission notes that the petition complains of the presumed violation of rights protected in the American Convention on Human Rights, and in particular those in its Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 11.2, 17, 24, 25, 26 and 32. 52. The petition also complains of violations of Articles 3, 10 and 15 of the Protocol of San Salvador. The Commission notes that although it lacks jurisdiction to establish violations of those Articles of the Protocol of San Salvador, it will take into consideration those provisions 1 IACHR, Report Nº 28/98, case 11.625, Maria Eugenia Morales de Sierra, March 6, 1998, Guatemala, Annual Report 1997. 2 IACHR, Report Nº 52/00, cases 11.830 and 12.038, Dismissed Workers of Congress, Peru, June 15, 2000, Annual Report 2000. 3 IACHR, Report Nº 10/91, Case 10.169, Banco de Lima, Annual Report 1990-1991. In that case, the Commission recognized its jurisdiction to protect the rights of an individual whose property was expropriated, but not to protect "the rights of juridical beings" such as corporations or banking institutions. Idem, para. 2. 4 IACHR, Report Nº 47/97, Tabacalera Boqueron, October 16, 1997, Paraguay, Annual Report 1997. 5 IACHR, Report Nº 39/99, Mevopal S.A., March 11, 1999, para. 20, Argentina, Annual Report 1998. 6 IACHR, Report Nº 106/99, Bendeck Cohdinsa, September 27, 1999, paras 17 ff., Honduras, Annual Report 1999. 6