11 Domingo Monterrosa, commander-in-chief of the Atlacatl Battalion, as the leader of the operation. Those 33 reports also mentioned the participation of other military units, in particular of the Salvadoran Air Force . 53. According to the Tutela Legal, the following were in charge of the operation: Lieutenant Colonel Domingo Monterrosa, commander-in-chief of the Atlacatl Batallion; the Commander of the Military Detachment of San Francisco Gotera; the Commander in chief of the San Miguel infantry brigade; Major Cáceres Cabrera of the Atlacatl Battalion; Captain Salazar of the Atlacatl Battalion; and for captains of the Atlacatl Battalion. In its report, Americas Watch indicates that, based on the information available, the head of the third brigade at the time was Lieutenant Colonel Jaime Ernesto Flores Grijalva and the head of the fourth military detachment was Elmer González Araujo. 54. When the operation was over, the troops of each company of Atlacatl Battalion regrouped in the canton of Guacamaya, where the operation leaders expressed satisfaction with the results. According to testimony collected by the Tutela Legal, Domingo Monterrosa spoke to the commanders and 34 used the phrase “mission accomplished”. 2. The massacre in the village of El Mozote 55. The village of El Mozote is located in Guacamaya canton, jurisdiction of Meanguera, Department of Morazán. At the time of the events it consisted of approximately 20 houses located on open ground and grouped around a central square. Facing the square was a church and a small building 35 known as “the convent”. Close by was the school. After the massacre the village of El Mozote was abandoned for several years, and then a resettlement process began, and by 2001 it was fully inhabited, 36 with new buildings. 56. Counterinsurgency operations were a common occurrence in 1981, and consequently some of the residents no longer lived permanently in their homes but took hiding in the bush during the 37 times of greatest danger. 57. In or around the first week of December 1981, a merchant by the name of Marcos Diaz made public a warning given by armed forces officers to the effect that a large-scale operation would soon be launched in the area. The soldier recommended that he tell the villagers to gather together in El Mozote, for if they were found together they would not be harmed. As a result of these rumors, many people abandoned their homes and moved into the center of the village, and in particular into the house 38 of Marcos Diaz. 33 According to the Tutela Legal, the following were in charge of the operation: Lieutenant Colonel Domingo Monterrosa, commander-in-chief of the Atlacatl Batallion; the Commander of the Military Detachment of San Francisco Gotera; the Commander in chief of the San Miguel infantry brigade; Major Cáceres Cabrera of the Atlacatl Battalion; Captain Salazar of the Atlacatl Battalion; and for captains of the Atlacatl Battalion. In its report, Americas Watch indicates that, based on the information available, the head of the third brigade at the time was Lieutenant Colonel Jaime Ernesto Flores Grijalva and the head of the fourth military detachment was Elmer González Araujo. 34 Tutela Legal. The mass executions in El Mozote and neighboring locales, July 23, 1992 (Annex A to the petitioners’ communication of November 11, 2002). 35 Truth Commission report, op. cit. 36 Report of the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team on the exhumations conducted in 2001 (Annex F. to the petitioners’ communication of November 11, 2002) 37 Tutela Legal. The mass executions in El Mozote and neighboring locales, July 23, 1992 (Annex A to the petitioners’ communication of November 11, 2002). Statement of Rufina Amaya before the Tutela Legal on October 10, 1990 (annexed to the initial petition of October 30, 1990). The statement of Mrs. Rufina Amaya was also cited in a report by the Human Rights Institute of the Central American University José Simeón Cañas (IDHUCA). See IDHUCA report, Consideraciones sobre la impunidad a propósito de la masacre del El Mozote (“Considerations on Impunity with Respect to the El Mozote Massacre”), No. 451 of November 7, 1990. 38 Tutela Legal, op. cit. On this point, Mrs. Rufina Amaya, a survivor of the El Mozote massacre, declared that “in early December of 1981, a man named Marcos Diaz was told to advise people to group themselves together in the village of El Mozote because soldiers of the Atlacatl Battalion were going to enter that place in an operation and anyone found on the outskirts of El Mozote would be killed. Mr. Diaz told people that if they were found together nothing would happen, but if they scattered they would