6 of the lack of evidence. Although new evidence had come to light with the exhumations conducted in 2000 and 2001, that was merely circumstantial and not sufficient to identify the individuals who took part in the massacre. 29. The State argues that “not every ruling unfavorable to the petitioners implies a denial of justice. The judges are bound by the evidence available and submitted in the process, and while they have broad powers some circumstances are beyond their control, such as the loss of records or files, which cannot be replaced by other means.” 30. With specific regard to application of the LAGCP by the examining judge, the State argued that this was reasonable by virtue of the constitutional presumption of innocence and the principles of legality and juridical security, as the perpetrators of the massacre had not been individualized and identified in the criminal proceedings. Moreover, the amnesty was an integral and essential part of the peace process, it was constitutional, and was covered by international humanitarian law, specifically the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional protocols of 1977 to which El Salvador was party. The peace process in El Salvador was successful and without the amnesty it would not have been possible to establish guarantees for the cessation of hostilities and to reintegrate members of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (hereinafter “the FMLN”) into the country’s legal, civil, institutional and political life. The State insists that “amnesty is a sovereign grace, a collective grace to guarantee social and political peace, for it constitutes the juridical expression of a political act that opens a democratic process and favors national consensus, with the primary objective of avoiding an internal crisis situation”. The State also provided a detailed account of the peace accords and the positive assessment of the United Nations Secretary-General during commemoration of the 10th and 15th anniversaries of the El Salvador peace accords. 31. The State notes that in October 2003 Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice declared that the LAGCP was not unconstitutional per se and that it was up to the judge in each case to apply it or not to certain persons. That ruling, consequently, opened the way for the petitioners to use the judicial mechanism, but they did not do so. 32. As to the right to life, the State recognizes that “as a result of the armed confrontations that took place during the Salvadoran conflict there was a lamentable loss of human lives as collateral damage from the confrontations.” Nevertheless, “at no time during the conflict was the civilian population considered a military target. On the contrary, people were protected and assisted, to the extent possible, by the government institutions responsible for providing the needed humanitarian aid, without distinction of any kind.” 33. As to the rights of the child, the State has asked the Commission to recognize that the State could not be held responsible for “the lamentable deaths of children during the armed conflict in the country, and especially in the El Mozote area during the 1980s”, as it signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child only on July 10, 1990. It was unacceptable to allege violation of a convention that had no legal force at the time the alleged offense occurred. In the same vein, the State notes that the InterAmerican Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture was ratified on October 17, 1994, many years after the alleged offense. IV. EVIDENCE A. Background 1. The armed conflict in El Salvador and the counterinsurgency campaign in the period from 1980 to 1983