based on a model of values that the inter-American system strives to preserve, from the 'best perspective' for the protection of the individual.12 14. Ever since the first case was brought before the Court, it has stipulated, "[t] he object and purpose of the American Convention is the effective protection of human rights. Therefore, the Convention must be interpreted so as to give it its full meaning and to allow the system of protection of human rights of the Commission and the Court to become fully 'effective.’" 13 15. The Court also took into account that Article 29 of the American Convention on the "Norms of Interpretation" provides clear hermeneutical guidelines such that the interpretation of the Convention can not be done in a way that: a) allow[s] a State Party, group or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or restrict them more than the manner provided for in the Convention; b) limit[s] the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized pursuant to the laws of any State Party or pursuant to any another convention that the States form part of; c) exclud[es] other rights or guarantees that are inherent to the human being or that are derived from a representative democratic form of government; d) exclud[es] or limit[s] the effect produced by the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and other international acts of the same nature. 16. The jurisprudence of the Court sets forth that although this provision is in "Part I—State Obligations and Rights Protected" of the American Convention, Article 29 requires not only the States that have ratified the Convention but also the Court itself to exercise its jurisdiction and authority to interpret the Convention. In this sense, both in its contentious and advisory role, on several occasions, the Court has referred to this provision for the purposes of interpreting the American Convention, in three areas: 1) to clarify the content of certain provisions of the Convention, 2) to establish criteria for interpretation, such as the principle of "evolutionary interpretation" of human rights treaties, the principle of "implementation of the most favorable norm for the protection of human rights" and the prohibition of depriving rights of their core content, and 3) to determine the scope of its advisory jurisdiction.14 12 Case of González et al. ("Cotton Field") v. Mexico, supra note 9, para. 33. 13 Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 1, para. 30. 14 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. ("First Disputes Court") v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, para. 217 to 219. 5