justice is exercised in one instance and the corresponding Convention states that the decisions of the Court are binding on the parties."27 Therefore, the Court still legally has "consideration" of the case while compliance of the respective judgment is being verified by the Court. This has been reflected in the judgments of the Court where is has consistently has been set forth in the operative paragraphs, with varying wording, that "[p]ursuant to the provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights, the Court shall monitor the full compliance with this Judgement and it will close the [...] case once the State has fully implemented the provisions set forth thereof." Therefore, the Court's "consideration" the case ends only after the State has complied in full with the respective judgment and when the Court so declares, leaving no doubt, thus, that in that context the Court has perfect and strong jurisdiction in matters of provisional measures. 27. The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court illustrates, incidentally, that even when a judgment has been passed there have been situations that endanger the rights involved in the decision of the Court and, therefore, hinder the effective compliance with the ruling. On this point, it should be noted that the Court has already ruled, "the effectiveness of judgments depends on their execution. The process should lead to the materialization of the protection of the right recognized in the judicial ruling, by the proper application of this ruling."28 Therefore, on several occasions, the Court has ordered provisional measures, or has maintained provisional measures ordered prior to its decision on merits, during the monitoring of compliance with judgments, precisely because the compliance of its decisions "is strongly related to the right to access to justice, which is embodied in Articles 8 (Right to a Fair Trial) and 25 (Judicial Protection) of the American Convention."29 Furthermore, the Inter-American Court has ordered the adoption of provisional measures after a decision to lift them, when during the monitoring of compliance events have taken place that, according to Article 63(2) of the Convention, have made them necessary. On this point, it is worth stating that the measures ordered in the case of Mister Delgado and Santana v. Colombia. On January 29, 1997, the Court issued a judgment on reparations in this case. Two days later, the Court issued an order lifting the provisional measures it had previously ordered. But three months later, on April 16, 1997, the Court issued an order, again, providing for the adoption of these measures. This was not only at the request of representatives of the victims but also the State itself. What Colombia specifically requested on that occasion was: To [c]onsider the possibility of reviewing the content of the order [of January 31, 1997], and instead, to order the continuation of the measures ordered, as long as the risk situation continues, bearing in mind that the internal proceedings are currently being carried out by the investigating authorities [...] The Government of Colombia will inform the Honorable Court when it considers that the situation no longer warrants maintenance of the measures requested, but until then, it trusts that these will be maintained, inasmuch as it is a question of protecting the life and physical integrity of those persons 27 García Ramírez, Sergio, "Reflexiones sobre las medidas provisionales en la jurisdicción interamericana," presentation of the first edition by Cantor Rey, Ernesto and Rey Anaya, Angela Medidas provisionales y medidas cautelares en el sistema interamericano de derechos humanos 2nd Edition, Bogota, Temis, 2008, pp. XLIII y XLIV. 28 Case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama. Competence. Judgment of November 28, 2003. Series C No. 104, para. 73. 29 Case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama, supra note 28, para. 74. 10