(hereinafter “COIP” according to its initials in Spanish), which is currently in force. In the COIP, the crime of slanderous insult was changed to be called slander, and the classification underwent substantial changes. In this regard, the State argued that the new structure of the norm meets the requirements of clarity, precision and limits the punishable conduct. It also stated that, through legal reforms, Ecuadorian regulations have sought to be compatible with the standards of the Inter-American System regarding proportionality. Furthermore, regarding the "punitive civil sanctions", it stated that the regulations applied to the victims were repealed by the COIP, so that in each case the judge must determine the comprehensive reparation. Consequently, the State considered that a pronouncement by the Court on the matter is not necessary. Regarding the request for training, the State stated that judicial officials have received a large number of virtual courses on human rights issues, which include content on freedom of expression. For this reason, the State considered that a pronouncement by the Court on this aspect is not necessary. D.2. Considerations of the Court D.2.1. Legislative amendments and conventionality control 177. In this case, the State recognized that Articles 489 and 493 of the Criminal Code in force at the time of the events, which allowed punishing acts that constituted "serious slanderous insult against authority," did not comply with the principle of strict legality and were contrary to the right to freedom of expression, and as such constituted a violation of article 2 of the American Convention, in relation to articles 9 and 13 of the same instrument. The Court also notes that Ecuadorian criminal legislation regarding crimes against honor has been modified since the entry into force of the COIP in 2014. 237 178. In this regard, the Court notes that, based on the information presented by the State, said legislative amendments constitute progress in fulfilling the duty to adopt domestic legal measures. In particular, the Court notes that although the COIP did not expressly eliminate the possibility of criminal prosecution for criticism directed at public officials in the exercise of their duties, since slander and "class four offenses" could be used in practice to condemn speech related to matters of public interest, 238 the reformed norm eliminated the possibility of prosecuting the crime of “slanderous insult against authority”, as occurred in this case. Therefore, given that the applied norm has already been reformed, and there is no clear incompatibility between the current norm and the Convention, this Court does not consider it appropriate to order the modification of the COIP norms. In particular, article 182 classifies the crime against honor and good name in the following terms: Slander - The person who, by any means, makes a false accusation of a crime against another, will be punished with a custodial sentence of six months to two years. Pronouncements made before authorities, judges and courts do not constitute slander, when the accusations/charges have been made due to the defense of the case. Whoever proves the veracity of the accusations will not be responsible for slander. However, in no case will evidence be admitted on the imputation of a crime that has been the subject of a judge confirming the innocence of the accused, dismissal or filing. There will be no criminal liability if the author of slander voluntarily retracts before an enforceable sentence is pronounced, provided that the publication of the retraction is made at the expense of the person responsible, is fulfilled in the same medium and with the same characteristics in which it was published. the imputation. The retraction does not constitute a form of admission of guilt. For its part, article 396 establishes the following: “Class four offences. The following shall be sanctioned with a custodial sentence of fifteen to thirty days: 1. The person who, by any means, utters expressions of discredit or dishonor against another. This violation will not be punishable if the expressions are reciprocal in the same act.” 237 238 Cf. Expert opinion of Juan Pablo Albán (Merits file, folio 1556). 57